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ONE  of the most widely perceived characteristics of economic recovery 
since early  1975  has been the relatively slow  growth of business fixed 
investment. At the end of 1978, for example, real GNP was 13.8 percent 
above the value attained at the cyclical peak five years earlier. By con- 
trast, the performance of real nonresidential fixed investment has been 
poor. Its previous peak value, reached in the first quarter of  1974,  was 
only surpassed in the second quarter of  1978. Even by the end of  1978, 
it was only 8.1 percent above the earlier peak. 
During the past five years, the apparent sluggishness of nonresidential 
fixed investment has generated pronouncements about the declining in- 
centive to invest and warnings that investment performance must be im- 
proved to maintain the growth of real income and of the supply capacity 
needed to reduce inflationary pressure. For example, in a widely publi- 
cized  speech in  October  1977,  Arthur Burns examined business fixed 
investment and found:  "In the two-and-a-half years of this  expansion, 
real capital outlays have increased only  half  as much  as they did,  on 
average, over like periods in the five previous expansions. The shortfall 
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has been  especially  marked  in the case of major  long-lived  industrial  con- 
struction  projects."' 
The outgoing  Republican  administration's  Council of Economic Ad- 
visers  stated  in its report  of January  1977: "The  growth  of nonresidential 
fixed investment  in 1976, especially  in the latter part of the year, was 
low for this stage  of the recovery."2  The new Democratic  administration's 
Council  was still worried  about fixed investment  in January  1978: "It 
appears,  however, that total investment  outlays during the expansion 
have fallen somewhat  short of those implied  by historical  relationships 
of investment  to its determinants."3  Because business  investment  plays 
an important  role both in the determination  of current  aggregate  demand 
and future growth of real income, it is appropriate  that this perceived 
"low investment"  be analyzed  in an explicitly quantitative  way, using 
econometric  techniques.  Much of this paper is devoted to just such an 
econometric  analysis;  it combines data on investment,  output, capital 
stock,  and  prices  with existing  theories  of investment  behavior  to provide 
a quantitative  review of the performance  of nonresidential  fixed invest- 
ment since 1973, and the possibilities  for improving  this performance  in 
1979 and  beyond. 
Four  Questions  about  Investment  Behavior 
While the econometric  evidence  is being discussed,  the reader  should 
focus on the following  four questions,  which the analysis  is designed  to 
answer. 
To what extent can the steep 1974-75  drop and subsequent slow re- 
covery of nonresidential fixed investment be explained by the standard 
theories of business investment? 
To answer  this question,  the actual  path of investment  since 1973 is 
compared  with  the path  forecasted  by several  econometric  models.  These 
comparisons  serve  three  purposes. 
First, if the best available  models consistently  underpredict  or over- 
1. Arthur F. Burns, "The Need for Better Profits,"  address at Gonzaga Univer- 
sity, Spokane,  Washington,  October  26, 1977, p. 3. 
2.  Economic Report of the President,  January  1977, p. 37. 
3. Economic Report of the President,  January  1978, pp. 70-71. Peter  K. Clark  75 
predict  since 1973, it could indicate  either a change  in behavior  or the 
existence  of additional  determinants  of investment  that  have  been ignored 
because  they remained  relatively  constant  before 1973. For example,  if 
increased  regulation  since 1973 has significantly  lowered the rate of 
return  on nonresidential  capital,  this reduction  should  show  up as a nega- 
tive  differential  between  actual  and  predicted  investment. 
Second, a  comparison of  the predictions of  various econometric 
models for the five-year  period from 1973 to  1978 provides a good 
"specification  test," especially  because  that interval  includes substantial 
variation  in investment,  output,  and other relevant  variables.  If some of 
the models predict well, the policy prescriptions  derived from them 
should  be given  more  weight  than  the policy conclusions  based  on models 
that  have  little  predictive  power. 
Third, post-sample  prediction  over a five-year  period allows a good 
test of the hypothesis  that a considerable  amount of "post-data  model 
construction"  has  been  used  in the formulation  of'the  econometric  models 
of investment  now in use. If "data mining"  is an important  problem, 
prediction  errors  outside  the sample  period  should  be significantly  larger 
than  within-sample  estimation  residuals. 
Which models or variables best explain the behavior of business fixed 
investment? In  particular, how  important are interest rates and  other 
capital cost considerations? 
This question  is central to the analysis  of investment;  if investment 
reacts  to the rental  price of capital  services  in the short  run, then direct 
investment  incentives,  such as the investment  tax credit or accelerated 
depreciation,  may be appropriate  tools for shifting aggregate  demand. 
In addition, the effect of market  interest rates on investment  demand 
becomes  an important  consideration  in the design  of policy. 
If output is the primary  determinant  of business  fixed investment  in 
the short  run, then the pro-cyclical  nature  of investment  is the most im- 
portant  consideration  in policy design. Only the long-run  effects of tax 
incentives  for investment  need to be considered,  and short-run  variations 
in interest  rates  are  not as crucial. 
What policies  are likely  to  be  most  effective in  maintaining or  in- 
creasing the share of nonresidential fixed investment in total output over 
the next few years? 
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1970s has been sluggish  performance  of productivity  growth.  Between 
1948 and 1965, labor productivity  in the nonfarm  business  sector grew 
almost  3 percent  a year. Between 1965 and 1973, this figure  dropped  to 
about  2 percent  a year.  And between  1973 and 1978, productivity  growth 
slowed  further  to only 1 percent  a year. While  reliable  estimates  are not 
yet available  of the effect  of nonresidential  capital  accumulation  on pro- 
ductivity  growth  since 1973, most economists  familiar  with the data at- 
tribute a substantial  role to slow growth in the capital stock. If the 
accumulation  of fixed  capital  is an important  determinant  of productivity 
growth,  policies  designed  to increase  the share  of output  devoted  to busi- 
ness  fixed  investment  become  more  important. 
What are the investment prospects for 1979-81? 
Once the econometric  models of investment  demand  have been esti- 
mated  for the 1954-78 period,  they can be used to project  nonresidential 
fixed  investment  for the next three  years.  Various  assumptions  about  the 
paths  of output,  interest  rates,  and  the stock  market  can  be tested  to deter- 
mine  their  effect  on the future  capital  stock  and  the investment  component 
of aggregate  demand. 
The purpose  of this paper is to obtain quantitative  answers  to these 
four questions.  First, five models of business investment  behavior are 
developed analytically.  These models roughly span the considerable 
range  of disagreement  among economists  about the determinants  of in- 
vestment  in fixed  capital.4  Next, the models are estimated  for equipment 
and structures  for the period from 1954 to mid-1973. Following a dis- 
cussion  of the estimates,  they are  used to project  investment  in equipment 
and structures  from 1973:3 to 1978:4. These projections  provide  quan- 
titative  answers  to the first  three questions  above. To investigate  further 
some puzzling  aspects of the results  for the recent period,  the behavior 
of various  components  of structures  and equipment  is analyzed.  Finally, 
forecasting  equations  derived  from  the 1954-78 period  are  used to assess 
the prospects  for business  fixed  investment  through  1981. 
4.  By using a number of  models, the problem of  "model dependence" in the 
analysis  is reduced.  The reader  can see how his favorite model explains the data and 
compare the results with those from competing models. This multimodel approach 
has been used previously  by Bischoff and Kopcke. See Charles  W. Bischoff, "Business 
Investment  in the 1970s: A Comparison  of Models,"  BPEA, 1:1971, pp. 13-58; and 
Richard  W. Kopcke, 'The Behavior of Investment Spending during the Recession 
and Recovery, 1973-76," New England Economic Review (November-December 
1977), pp. 5-41. Peter  K. Clark  77 
The  Models  of Business  Fixed  Investment 
Five models of business fixed investment  are discussed below: ac- 
celerator,  cash flow combined  with accelerator,  neoclassical, modified 
neoclassical,  and securities  value. These models are almost identical  to 
the ones studied  by Bischoff,  except that his simple  cash flow model has 
been  replaced  by one that  includes  an accelerator  term.5  No serious  inves- 
tigator  of U.S. investment  behavior  has proposed  a model  that  is based  on 
cash  flow  alone.  These  five  models  are  each applied  to two components  of 
real nonresidential  fixed  investment:  expenditures  on producers'  durable 
equipment  and  expenditures  on structures.6 
GENERALIZED  ACCELERATOR  MODEL 
Models of the accelerator  type relating  investment  in fixed capital  to 
changes  in output  have their  origins  in work  by J. M. Clark  early  in this 
century7  and later  modifications  by a number  of economists,  particularly 
Koyck and Chenery. Such models generally  take the empirical  form of 
a linear  relation  of current  net investment  to current  and past changes  in 
output.  The basic assumption  of any accelerator  model  is that  the desired 
capital  stock at any point in time is a constant  multiple  of output, Y, at 
that  time.  That  is, 
(1)  Kd  =  aY, 
where  Kd is the "desired"  capital stock, or the capital stock that would 
be chosen  by entrepreneurs  if net additions  to capital  were  instantaneously 
available  at a constant  price. 
If the capital stock could be instantaneously  adjusted  to the desired 
level at no additional  cost, actual capital and desired  capital would be 
5.  Bischoff, "Business  Investment  in the 1970s." 
6.  The primary reason for estimating separate equations will become apparent 
later in the paper. Although the explanatory variables for equipment are similar or 
identical for a given model, it turns out that the differential  between predicted and 
actual investment  is concentrated  in the structures  component. 
7.  J. Maurice Clark, "Business  Acceleration and the Law of Demand: A Tech- 
nical Factor in Economic Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 25  (March 
1917),  pp. 217-35. 
8. L. M. Koyck, Distributed  Lags and Investment  Analysis (Amsterdam:  North- 
Holland, 1954); and Hollis B. Chenery, "Overcapacity  and the Acceleration Prin- 
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equal; variations  in output would imply proportional  variations  in the 
capital stock and corresponding  violent swings in net investment.  The 
fact is, however,  that  the nonresidential  capital  stock changes  slowly  over 
time, and net investment,  while more volatile than output,  is much less 
variable  than such a strict accelerator  model would imply. To explain 
the slow reaction  of capital  to output, "flexibility"  is typically  added  to 
investment;  for various  reasons,  the reaction  of the capital  stock to out- 
put  is spread  over  a number  of time  periods,  through  a set of distributed  lag 
coefficients  (p8): 
CO 
IN =  K -  =K-1  E  8(Kd  -  K.8). 
8=0 
Thus 
(2)  IN  =  a f2  I(Y_ 
8=0 
where  IN is net investment  in time period t and K is the actual  stock of 
capital. This flexible accelerator  (equation 2)  has remained  a popular 
empirical  representation  of aggregate  investment  behavior,  primarily  be- 
cause  it fits  observed  series  of investment  and  output  well. 
Although a number  of theories have been proposed to explain the 
flexible  accelerator  model,  perhaps  the most  satisfactory  is an adjustment- 
cost approach  first suggested by Eisner and Strotz.9  In it, firms  pay a 
penalty for having a capital stock different  from the desired level and 
incur adjustment  costs, A, in trying  to move to that level: 
(3)  A  = f(Kd-  K)  +  g(K-  K.1),  f(O)  =  g(O) =  0; 
otherwise,  f  >  0,  g  >  0, 
where 
f(.)  )-cost  of having a capital stock different  from Kd, the static 
optimum  for the output  of the current  period 
g(*) =  cost of adjusting  the capital  stock. 
The actual  net investment  undertaken  is the one that minimizes  costs in 
the trade-off  between f  (having too much or too little capital) and g 
(incurring  costs of adjustment).  In principle,  installation  costs, rising 
supply  prices  for capital  goods, and  production  lags could all be included 
in an adjustment-cost  framework.  If g displays  the property  that adjust- 
9.  Robert Eisner and Robert H. Strotz, "Determinants  of Business Investment," 
in Daniel B. Suits and others, Impacts of Monetary Policy,  a series of  research 
studies for the Commission  on Money and Credit (Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 59-338. Peter  K. Clark  79 
ment is increasingly  costly (so  that doubling investment more than 
doubles  adjustment  cost), then partial  adjustment  is optimal,  and invest- 
ment should move the capital stock only part way toward its desired 
level  in any  one period.10 
The usual  theoretical  discussion  of the flexible  accelerator  ends at this 
point, having either implicitly or explicitly assumed that expectations 
about  future  levels of output are static: expected  future  output  is equal 
to its current  level. Such an assumption  is clearly unwarranted  at a 
theoretical  level;  firms  expect  future  output  to move  in a number  of ways, 
and  plan long-range  production  strategy  ten or more  years  in advance.  If 
expectations  about  future  output  are not static, then investment  in time 
period  t should  be a function  of all the expected  future  levels of output, 
which should in turn be functions of past output and any other past 
variables  that are important  in forming  expectations  of future  output.1' 
Implicitly  or explicitly,  the modern  interpretation  of the accelerator 
model assumes  that past levels of output are the most important  deter- 
minants  of expectations  about  future  output,  and  that  other  variables  that 
might  have been included  in the model either  have little impact on ex- 
pectations or are observed with such large errors that they are best 
omitted  altogether  in empirical  work. 
The discussion  thus far has focused on net additions  to the capital 
stock, and has ignored  replacement  investment.  If it can be assumed  that 
depreciation  is approximately  exponential  and that the replacement  of 
depreciated  capital  responds  linearly  to current  and lagged output,  then 
gross investment,  1, can be represented  as a distributed  lag on output, 
plus a constant  multiplied  by the capital  stock of the last period  :12 
co 
(4)  I  =  fEsA  Y_8  +  dK_1. 
a80 
10. See Michael Rothschild, "On the Cost of Adjustment,"  Quarterly  Journal of 
Economics, vol. 85 (November 1971), pp. 605-22. 
11. For a discussion of some of the problems in specifying the lag structure  in a 
simple model of this sort, see Marc Nerlove, "Lags in Economic Behavior,"  Econo- 
metrica,  vol. 40 (March 1972), pp. 221-51. Such theoretical considerations  have not 
yet proved fruitful  in many empirical  applications. 
12. It has been correctly argued that replacement  investment is not likely to fol- 
low automatically the depreciation  of old capital. See, for example, Martin S. Feld- 
stein and David K. Foot, "The Other Half of Gross Investment: Replacement and 
Modernization  Expenditures,"  Review of Economics and Statistics,  vol. 53 (February 
1971), pp. 49-58.  Nonetheless, equation 4 may still be a reasonable representation 
of gross investment  if a higher capital stock implies higher replacement  expenditure 
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Equation  4, with a finite number  of lag coefficients  and adjustment  for 
residual  heteroscedasticity  leads to equation  5, which is used below for 
estimation:  for reasons  explained  in appendix  A, I allow  for the presence 
of a nonzero  constant  term, 
(5)  =  -  +  Ib8  AI:+d  C+  u, 
u  =  pu1L  +  e,  E(Ete8)j  =2  for t-s, 
where 
I =  investment  in equipment  or structures  at 1972 prices 
YP =  potential  GNP at 1972  prices;  estimate  of the Council  of Eco- 
nomic  Advisers 
A  Y =  Y -  Y-1, where Y is private nonresidential business output at 
1972  prices,  defined  as the gross  domestic  product  of the private 
business  sector  minus  gross  housing  product 
K =  net stock of equipment  or structures  at 1972  prices 
b8 =  ao/8. 
Division of all variables  (approximately)  by potential  GNP is based on 
the assumption  that the standard  deviation  of the error  variance  rises in 
direct  proportion  with  the size  of the economy.13 
ACCELERATOR-CASH  FLOW  MODEL 
The theoretical  justifications  for adding  a profits  or cash-flow  term  to 
an accelerator  investment  equation  can be grouped  into two broad cate- 
gories. First, changes in profits should convey some new information 
13. The AY_, term is divided by YP,s  instead of YP in order to use existing com- 
puter programs for estimating  Almon distributed  lags. By doing so, the variance of 
the estimated  coefficients  is increased  very slightly. 
Tests of heteroscedasticity  using the Goldfeld-Quandt  method indicate that the 
disturbance  variance may increase slightly faster than the square of potential output 
for equipment, and slower than the square of potential output for structures. See 
Stephen M. Goldfeld and Richard E. Quandt, "Some Tests for Homoscedasticity," 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 60  (June 1965), pp. 539-47. 
Division by potential output in the estimation both of equipment and structures  was 
chosen primarily for simplicity after it was determined that more complicated pro- 
cedures  give nearly identical  results. Peter  K. Clark  81 
about the future profitability  of  a firm, possibly increasing expected 
future output and boosting the optimal future path of capital stock.'4 
Second,  internal  funds could be less costly than external  finance,  if the 
market  for borrowed  funds is imperfect,  perhaps  because of differences 
in information  about the riskiness  of new investment.'5  Larger  amounts 
of internal  funds might therefore  lower financing  costs and increase  in- 
vestment  demand.  Eisner has investigated  this "profits  and output"  ap- 
proach  to the estimation  of investment  demand  using a number  of dif- 
ferent  sets  of data.'6 
The empirical  specification  of the accelerator-cash  flow  model is iden- 
tical to the simple accelerator  (equation 5),  except that an additional 
distributed  lag on the level of cash flow is included as an explanatory 
variable: 
I  a  NbA  YB+,  CFs  +  K-,  +, 
(6)  -P =  -P +  2fi  b8  yp+  C8 yp  +  dyp+u  IyP  yP+8=  8YP-8  =  yP_1  YP 
where CF is the real cash flow of nonfinancial  corporations.  Nominal 
cash flow is the sum of after-tax  profits,  capital-consumption  allowances 
without  capital-consumption  adjustment,  and  the inventory  valuation  ad- 
justment.  The investment  deflator  for equipment  or structures  (whichever 
is appropriate)  is applied  to nominal  cash  flow  to derive  CF. 
NEOCLASSICAL  MODEL 
Both the simple accelerator  and its cash-flow  variant  lack a feature 
that most economists  consider  crucial: investment  does not depend on 
the price of capital in either model. Jorgenson  and a number  of col- 
leagues have attempted  to remedy this defect by developing a model 
based on the neoclassical principle that the optimal combination  of 
14. For discussions along this line, see Lawrence R. Klein, Economic Fluctua- 
tions in the United States, 1921-1941  (Wiley, 1950); and Yehuda Grunfeld, "The 
Determinants  of Corporate  Investment,"  in Arnold C. Harberger,  ed., Thle  Demand 
for Durable Goods (University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 211-66. 
15. Duesenberry has been a proponent of this view. See James S. Duesenberry, 
Business Cycles and Economic Growth (McGraw-Hill, 1958). 
16. A good summary of this research is contained in Robert Eisner, Factors in 
Business Investment (Ballinger for the National  Bureau of  Economic Research, 
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factor  inputs  should be a function  of their relative  prices.'7  If output  is 
produced  under competitive  conditions  and technology  can adequately 
be described  by a Cobb-Douglas  production  function,  the desired  capital 
stock at each point in time should  be a linear  function  of output: 
(7)  Kd  PY 
where 
y  share  of capital  in output 
p = price  of output 
C =  rental  price  of capital  services.'8 
Then if expectations  are static so that future changes  in output are un- 
anticipated,  net investment  can be represented  as a distributed  lag on 
past  changes  in desired  capital  stock: 
N 
(8)  IN  =  2  p8(AKT8. 
8=0 
Adding the usual term dK,  for the replacement  of the capital lost to 
exponential  depreciation,  dividing  by potential  GNP to correct  for heter- 
oscedasticity,  and  adding  a stochastic  error  term,  Jorgenson's  neoclassical 
investment  model  becomes: 
IJ  N  c 
(9)  -  = 
-fI  +  E  hs  p  +  d  +  u, 
where  h8  equals  yf. 
In essence,  the neoclassical  model is a variant  of the accelerator  equa- 
tion, with the capital-output  ratio allowed to vary inversely with the 
relative  price of capital  inputs.  While  the inclusion  of relative  prices  is a 
step  in the right  direction  by theoretical  standards,  empirically  it could be 
17. See, for example, Dale W. Jorgenson,  "The Theory of Investment  Behavior," 
in Robert Ferber, ed., Determinants of Investment Behavior, Universities-National 
Bureau Conference Series, 18 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1967), pp. 
129-55; or Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson, "Application  of the Theory of 
Optimum  Capital Accumulation,"  in Gary Fromm, ed., Tax Incentives and Capital 
Spending  (Brookings  Institution, 1971), pp. 9-60. 
18. The rental price of capital services is the cost of using one unit of capital 
goods for one year. Thus, in various forms, it includes terms for the interest rate, 
depreciation,  various tax parameters,  and inflation. The variant of the rental price 
of capital services used in estimating the neoclassical models is the one chosen by 
Hall and Jorgenson.  See appendix  B. Peter  K. Clark  83 
either  better  or worse.  In general,  investment  should  be a function  of ex- 
pected  future  interest  rates,  prices,  and taxes. In addition,  considerations 
of adjustment  cost indicate  that optimal  net investment  should follow a 
dynamic decision rule based on expectations  about future output, as 
pointed  out earlier  in the discussion  of the accelerator  model.  Equation  9 
arises from strong simplifying  assumptions  about the way the relative 
price  of capital  services  affects  changes  in the capital  stock;  these  assump- 
tions  may  or may  not be empirically  valid. 
MODIFIED  NEOCLASSICAL  MODEL 
One widely accepted  variant of Jorgenson's  neoclassical  model has 
been analyzed  in a number  of articles  by Charles  Bischoff.19  Bischoff's 
amendment  to the neoclassical  model arises  from the empirical  observa- 
tion that most modifications  in the capital-output  ratio are embodied  in 
new equipment and structures;  existing capital goods are less often 
modified  in response to fluctuations  in the relative price of inputs. If 
factor proportions  can only be altered  ex ante, then the distributed  lag 
of investment  on changes  in the relative  price of capital  services  should 
have a different  shape  from the distributed  lag of investment  on changes 
in output. Bischoff's  formulation  of the investment  function allows for 
such  a difference  in distributed  lag structure: 
N  /  -  y\8 
N  s/  1y\s  (10)  I  =  a +  ,Is(  8)  +Ek8  (5-  k-)  +  dK_I +  u. 
o  C_s/1  8=0  C_s_1 
A major  difference  between  equation  10 and  the neoclassical  equation 
9 is that Y_,  is divided  by C s 1 instead  of by C ,, an alteration  that  makes 
investment  a function  of the level of the rental  price of capital  services, 
rather  than a function of differences.  The Cobb-Douglas  form of the 
production  function (with a unitary elasticity of substitution) is still 
assumed  in Bischoff's  formulation.  When  adjusted  for heteroscedasticity, 
the modified  neoclassical  model in estimation  form is 
(11)  =  -a  +  is(p~Y 
YP  YP  d=O  YP_s  C-8- 
N  _  /  _o_  Y_o  \  _  _1 
19. See Charles W. Bischoff, "The Effect of Alternative Lag Distributions,"  in 
Fromm, ed., Tax Incentives and Capital  Spending,  pp. 61-125, and "Business  Invest- 
ment in the 1970s." 84  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1979 
SECURITIES-VALUE  (Q)  MODEL 
The preceding  four models are variations  on a single theme; while 
some  of the specifications  include  price and  income  variables,  investment 
is primarily  a function  of changes  in output.  In contrast  to these output- 
based models,  the securities-value  model attempts  to explain  investment 
on a financial  basis in terms of portfolio balance.  Roughly speaking,  if 
the market  value of a firm  exceeds the replacement  cost of its assets, it 
can increase  its market  value by investing  in more fixed capital. Con- 
versely,  if the market  value of a firm  is less than the replacement  cost of 
its assets,  it can increase  the value of shareholders'  equity  by reducing  its 
stock  of fixed  assets. 
Theoretical  models emphasizing  the relationship  between  investment 
and  the ratio  of market  value  to replacement  cost, Q, have  been proposed 
by a number  of authors,  particularly  James  Tobin.20  Models of this type 
can be viewed as supplements  to output-based  models, rather  than as 
direct competitors;  both investment  and the ratio of market value to 
replacement cost  react to  the  same state of  long-run expectations 
about future output and prices. When real capital is expected to be 
profitable  in the future,  both investment  and Q rise. Conversely,  pessi- 
mistic  expectations  about profitability  in the near future  should depress 
both variables.  Investment  and Q could be positively  correlated,  even if 
both are  reacting  to changes  in output  and  prices.21 
The empirical  specification  of the securities-value  model is given in 
equation  12: 
J  N 
(12)  -  a +  E  m8Q-. +  u. 
K_  1  o80 
20. William C. Brainard and James Tobin, "Pitfalls in Financial Model Build- 
ing," American Economic Review, vol.  58  (May  1968, Papers and Proceedings, 
1967),  pp. 99-122; and James Tobin, "A General Equilibrium Approach to Mon- 
etary Theory,"  Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 1 (February 1969), pp. 
15-29. A derivation  of the same relationship  that Tobin proposes in an adjustment- 
cost framework is given in Robert E. Lucas, Jr. and Edward C. Prescott, "Invest- 
ment Under Uncertainty,"  Econometrica,  vol. 39 (September 1971), pp. 659-81. 
21.  Ciccolo presents evidence that tends to reject this type of causality (output 
to Q, output to investment), although such statistical "causality"  tests are open to 
question when any variable is chosen optimally. See John H. Ciccolo, Jr., "Money, 
Equity Values, and Income," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 10 (Feb- 
ruary 1978),pp. 54-57. Peter  K. Clark  85 
Two problems  occur in data used to construct  Q that can impair  the 
fit of equation  12 to the observed  data.22  First, the capital stock is not 
homogeneous,  so that the estimate  of replacement  cost in the denomi- 
nator of Q may have only a tenuous connection  with the true cost of 
replacing  existing  capacity.  In other  words,  the calculated  Q is an average 
for all existing  capital,  rather  than  the marginal  ratio  that  would  be really 
appropriate  for decisions  about (marginal)  additions  to the capital  stock. 
Second, the stock market  exhibits a substantial  amount of quarter-to- 
quarter  noise that might rationally  be ignored  by investment  decision- 
makers  if short-term  manipulation  of a company's  own stock is either 
costly  or illegal. 
Estimation  Results:  1954:1 to 1973:2 
Summary  statistics  resulting  from the estimation  of equations 5, 6, 
9, 11, and 12 for equipment  and structures  are given in tables 1 and 2, 
respectively.23  "Output-based"  equations  for equipment  fit fairly well; 
their unadjusted  standard  errors  of estimate  average  about one-quarter 
of a percent  of potential  GNP. The plot for the accelerator  model in the 
top panel  of figure  1 is typical.  The securities-value  equation  (also shown 
in figure  1) does not fit  as well, reflecting  divergences  between  the  behavior 
of investment  and  the stock  market. 
The results  for structures  are significantly  worse, as illustrated  in the 
bottom  panel of figure 1 and in table 2, where estimated  values tend to 
miss all but the largest  movements,  resulting  in standard  errors  that are 
almost  twice as large (in percentage  terms) as those for equipment. 
As of mid-1973,  the two  most  promising  models  for explaining  business 
fixed  investment-the sum  of equipment  and  structures-are the modified 
neoclassical  model and the simple accelerator.  While the modified  neo- 
classical  model looks substantially  better in terms of historical  fit (the 
unadjusted  standard  errors  of estimate  are about 30 percent  smaller), it 
22. For  a  detailed discussion of  the  construction of  Q,  see  George M.  von 
Furstenberg,  "Corporate  Investment: Does Market Valuation Matter in the Aggre- 
gate?" BPEA, 2:1977, pp. 347-97.  The Q-ratio used in this study is von Fursten- 
berg's,  updated  through 1978 by the author. 
23. The first observation of the dependent variable in the estimation period is 
1954:1. With five-year lags, differencing, and autocorrelation  corrections, data are 
required  on the independent  variables  from as early as 1948. 86  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1979 




Independent  variable  Accelerator-  Neo-  neo-  Securities 
and  summary  statistic  Accelerator  cash  flow  classical  classical  value 
Independent  variable 
Constant  -11.5  -9.1  -9.6  -5.5  0.055 
(2.8)  (4.2)  (4.0)  (5.5)  (0.030) 
Capital  stock  0.19  0.13  0.20  0.13 
(0.01)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.08) 
Change  in outputb 
Current  period  0.10  0.12  0.04  0.10  ... 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
Lagged  (quarters) 
4  0.18  0.19  0.09  0.14  ... 
(0.02)  (0.05) 
8  0.14  0.14  0.08  0.09  ... 
(0.02)  (0.06) 
12  0.08  0.05  0.03  0.11  ... 
(0.02)  (0.04) 
16  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.09  ... 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
20  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.06  ... 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
Long-run  effect  ...  ...  ...  0.03  ... 
Lagged  cash flow (quarters) 
4  ...  -0.03  ...  ...  ... 
(0.05) 
8  ...  0.03  ...  ...  ... 
(0. 04) 
12  ...  0.03  ...  ... 
(0.04) 
16  ...  0.06  ...  ...  ... 
(0.05) 
Sum of coefficients  ...  0.20  ...  ...  .. 
(0. 19) 
Change  in inverse  of rental 
price of capital  servicese 
Current period  ...  ...  10.4  1.0  ... 
Lagged  (quarters) 
4  ...  ...  26.5  2.4  ... 
8  ...  ...  21.6  3.5 
12  ...  ...  9.8  4.7  ... 
16  ...  ...  2.6  5.6 
20  ...  ...  3.5  6.5 
Long-run effect  ...  ...  ...  6.5  ... Peter K. Clark  87 
Table  1 (continued) 
Model 
Modified 
Independent  variable  Accelerator-  Neo-  neo-  Securities 
and  summary  statistic  Accelerator cash  flow  classical  classical  value 
Lagged Q (quarters) 
4  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.029 
(0.011) 
8  ...  ...  ...  ..  0.017 
(0.014) 
Sum of coefficients  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.168 
(0.036) 
Summary  statistic 
Standard  error  of estimated 
Adjusted  0.12  0.13  0.15  0.13  0.38 
Unadjustede  0.23  0.23  0.30  0.19  1.50 
.R2  0.97  0.97  0.96  0.97  0.94 
Durbin-Watson  2.10  2.24  1.77  2.04  1.79 
Rho  0.83  0.88  0.86  0.74  0.94 
Sources: Investment, real output, cash flow, and the investment deflator are from U.S. Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Analysis, national income and product accounts. Capital stock data are from estimates by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis of year-end totals, with quarterly data interpolated using quarterly data on real in- 
vestment. The Q variable is from George M. von Furstenberg, "Corporate  Investment: Does Market Valu- 
ation Matter in the Aggregate?" BPEA, 2:1977, pp. 351-54,  updated by the author for  1977 and  1978 
using the same methodology and flow-of-funds statistics supplied by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. Sources for the rental price of capital services appear in appendix B. The potential output 
series is from the Council of Economic Advisers. 
a.  Output is measured by real private nonresidential  business output. Real cash flow is the nominal cash 
flow (the sum of after-tax profits, capital consumption allowances without adjustment, and the inventory 
valuation adjustment) of the nonfinancial corporate sector, deflated by the investment deflator for pro- 
ducers' durable equipment. The variable used as the rental price of capital services is described  in appendix 
B. The Q variable is the ratio of market value to replaeement cost. Capital stock is the end-of-quarter  net 
stock of producers' durable equipment. All real variables are expressed in 1972 prices. The output-based 
equations have been corrected for heteroscedasticity using potential GNP,  as described in the text. All 
lagged variables have been fitted using sixth-degree Almon polynomials with no  end-point constraints. 
Only the coefficients on  every fourth lag are presented here. The numbers in parentheses are standard 
errors. 
b.  Evaluated at the 1973 level of the rental price of capital services in the neoclassical and modified neo- 
classical models. 
c.  Evaluated at the 1973 level of output. 
d. Expressed  as a percent of potential GNP. 
e.  Calculated without autoGorrelation  correction. 
should be noted that it has an additional  distributed  lag on the right- 
hand  side, which  contributes  an automatic  improvement  in fit. This find- 
ing (that the accelerator  model is a close competitor  to the modified 
neoclassical  model  in explaining  equipment  investment)  is different  from 
results  obtained  by Kopcke  and  by Ando and others,  who found that the 
modified  neoclassical  model fit historical  data  much  better  than a simple 88  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1979 
Table  2. Equations  for Investment  in Nonresidential  Structures,  AItemative  Models, 
1954:  1-1973:22a 
Model 
Modified 
Independent  variable  Accelerator-  Neo-  neo-  Securities 
and  summary  statistic  Accelerator cash  flow  classical  classical  value 
Independent  variable 
Constant  4.6  5.0  0.8  6.2  0.519 
(2.8)  (3.0)  (3.8)  (2.3)  (0.015) 
Capital  stock  0.07  0.03  0.09  0.01  .. 
(0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
Change  in outputb 
Current  period  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  ... 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
Lagged  (quarters) 
4  0.07  0.05  0.05  0.02  ... 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
8  0.06  0.02  0.05  0.01  ... 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
12  0.04  -0.01  0.04  0.05  ... 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
16  0.02  -0.00  0.02  0.07  ... 
(0.01)  (0.02) 
20  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.03  ... 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
Long-run  effecto  ...  ...  ...  0.03  ... 
Lagged  cash flow (quarters) 
4  ...  -0.01  ...  ...  ... 
(0.03) 
8  ...  0.04  ...  ... 
(0.02) 
12  ...  0.01  ... 
(0.02) 
16  ...  -0.02  ...  ...  ... 
(0.03) 
Sum of coefficients  ...  0.20  ... 
(0. 10) 
Change  in inverse  of rental 
price  of capital  servicesb 
Current  period  ...  ...  5.2  0.9  .. 
Lagged  (quarters) 
4  ...  ...  11.5  3.9  .. 
8  ...  ...  11.9  7.7  .. 
12  ...  ...  9.3  6.8 
16  ...  ...  4.9  4.2  .. 
20  ...  ...  -0.2  7.1  .. 
Long-run  effecto  ...  ...  ...  7.1 Peter  K. Clark  89 
Table 2 (continued) 
Model 
Modified 
Independent  variable  Accelerator-  Neo-  neo-  Securities 
and  summary  statistic  Accelerator cash  flow  classical  classical  value 
Lagged  Q (quarters) 
4  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.011 
(0.005) 
8  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.002 
(0.006) 
Sum  of  coefficients  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.059 
(0.015) 
Summary  statistic 
Standard error of estimated 
Adjusted  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.08  0.14 
Unadjustede  0.19  0.18  0.26  0.13  0.81 
A2  0.89  0.90  0.88  0.91  0.91 
Durbin-Watson  1.91  1.98  1.87  2.09  2.09 
Rho  0.90  0.89  0.93  0.78  0.98 
Source: Same as table 1. 
a.  For a description of the variables used in the regressions, see table 1, note a. The investment, capital 
stock, and investment deflator variables are those for nonresidential structures. The output-based equa- 
tions have been corrected for heteroscedasticity using potential GNP, as described in the text. All lagged 
variables have been fitted using sixth-degree Almon  polynomials with no  end-point constraints. Only 
the coefficients on every fourth lag are presented here. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
b.  Evaluated at the 1973 level of the rental price of capital services in the neoclassical and modified neo- 
classical models. 
c.  Evaluated at the 1973 level of output. 
d. Expressed as a percent of potential GNP. 
e.  Calculated without autocorrelation correction. 
accelerator.24  Kopcke's  results  stem  from  his use of a distributed  lag in the 
accelerator  that is only one year long; experiments  with unconstrained 
lags indicate  that  the accelerator  effect  may  last up to five  years.  Ando and 
others  estimate  an accelerator  model for equipment  that has no constant 
and  no dependence  on the capital  stock.  Such  constraints  degrade  its per- 
formance  substantially.  The standard  errors  for equipment  reported  in 
table 1 are about  the same  as those obtained  by Kopcke  and by Ando and 
24.  See Kopcke, "Behavior of Investment Spending";  and Albert K. Ando and 
others, "On the Role of  Expectations of  Price and Technological Change in  an 
Investment Function," International Economic Review, vol.  15  (June  1974), pp. 
384-414. 90  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1979 
Figure  1. Investment  in Producers'  Durable  Equipment  and Nonresidential  Structures, 
Estimates  from  the Securities-Value  and  Accelerator  Models, and  Actual  Investment, 
1954:1-1973:2a 
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Source: Actual-U.S.  Bureau of Economic Analysis, national income and product accounts; estimates- 
equations in tables 1 and 2. 
a.  Note the differences  in scale in the two panels. Peter K. Clark  91 
Table  3. Estimated  Standard  Errors  of Forecasts  One Period  and  Many Periods 
Ahead,  for Investment  in Producers'  Durable  Equipment  and  Nonresidential  Structures, 
Alternative  Models 
Percent  of potential  GNP 
Forecast  errora 
Model and type  One  period  Many  periods 
of investment  ahead  ahead 
Producers'  durable  equipment 
Accelerator  0.170  0.229 
Accelerator-cash  flow  0.182  0.271 
Neoclassical  0.206  0.299 
Modified  neoclassical  0.245  0.265 
Securities  value  0.221  0.588 
Nonresidential  structures 
Accelerator  0.123  0.200 
Accelerator-cash  flow  0.122  0.189 
Neoclassical  0.127  0.245 
Modified  neoclassical  0.125  0.147 
Securities  value  0.125  0.495 
Source: Same as table 1. Forecast errors were calculated from equations in  tables 1 and 2. Actual data 
for the independent variables during the forecast period were used only for calculating the IX. as defined 
in note a. 
a.  The forecast errors for one period and many periods ahead are calculated as 
vzV1+  "%)X'-1X 
and 
a.  1  )  +  XSI(X%X)-1XB 
U-  I2 
respectively,  where X8 is the vector of exogenous variables  used in the forecast, X is the matrix of independent 
variables used in estimation, and the tilde (-)  denotes the transformation X =  X-  X.i. 
others for the modified  neoclassical  model, but are substantially  lower 
for the accelerator.25 
Table 3 provides  the estimated  standard  error  of forecast  for each of 
the ten equations;  these statistics  are a good measure  of expected  fore- 
casting  ability.  For equipment,  the accelerator  model and  the accelerator- 
cash flow model should generate  the best one-period-ahead  forecasts; 
for forecasts  further  in the future,  the accelerator  model is expected  to 
be best. Even though  the modified  neoclassical  model has a lower stan- 
25. Kopcke's unadjusted standard errors are approximately $4.9 billion  (1972 
prices) for the equipment  accelerator and $1.2 billion for a variant of the modified 
neoclassical model. Ando and others obtain $4.2 billion (also in  1972 prices) for 
the accelerator and $1.7 billion for the modified neoclassical model. In table 1 the 
same figures  are approximately  $2.1 billion for the accelerator and $1.6 billion for 
the modified  neoclassical  model. 92  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1979 
dard  error  of estimate  (see table 1), the high estimated  variance  for its 
coefficients  degrades  its estimated  forecasting  performance  considerably. 
All the equations  for structures  have about  the same  forecast  variance  in 
the  short  run;  for a longer  period  (like the  interval  from  1973:3 to 1978:4, 
which  is the focus of the next section), the modified  neoclassical  model 
is expected  to forecast  best, with the accelerator-cash  flow model doing 
a little  better  than  the simple  accelerator. 
The high estimated  standard  errors  for the neoclassical  model indi- 
cate a fit that is significantly  worse than that for the other three output- 
based  models.  This inferior  statistical  performance  is discussed  and ana- 
lyzed in appendix  A. The key point developed  there is that the poor fit 
cannot  be attributed  merely  to the assumed  unitary  value of the elasticity 
of substitution. 
Forecast  Results:  1973:3 to 1978:4 
The predictive  performance  for the five  models  of investment  behavior 
is compared  in figure  2 for equipment,  and  in figure  3 for structures.  The 
forecasts  are generated  using  the models  in tables 1 and 2 and the values 
for the independent  variables  that were actually observed  for 1973:3 
to  1978:4; thus they represent  the projections  that might have been 
made in mid-1973 if the future  values of output and capital cost were 
known.26  These are much better than anyone  would have been able to 
make in 1973:2, not knowing  the true values of the independent  vari- 
ables. Still, the forecasts  are a stringent  test of the models because  until 
1973:2, output  grew  rapidly,  with little indication  that a severe  recession 
was  close at  hand. 
Equipment  investment  was surprisingly  strong  for the years 1974-76. 
As output  fell, it stayed  virtually  constant  from 1974:1 through  1974:3. 
Four of the five models  forecast  equipment  expenditures  at or below the 
actual  values  until  the cyclical  trough  in the first  quarter  of 1975. During 
the  first  two  years  of the recovery,  the accelerator-cash  flow,  the securities- 
value, and (by a small margin) the accelerator  models underpredict 
observed  values;  the neoclassical  and modified  neoclassical  models  fore- 
26. The variable for capital stock used in the forecast is K = I + (1 -  S)K-i, be- 
cause using the actual capital stock includes some information about investment. 
This refinement  changes  the forecasts  very little. Peter K. Clark  93 
Figure  2. Projections  of Investment  in Producers'  Durable  Equipment,  Alternative 
Models,  and  Actual  Investment,  1973:3-1978:4 
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Source: Same as table 1. The forecasts were generated using the equations in  table I and the actual 
data for the independent variables during the forecast period. 94  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1979 
Figure  3. Projections  of Investment  in Nonresidential  Structures,  Alternative  Models, 
and  Actual  Investment,  1973:3-1978:4 
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Source: Same as table 1. The forecasts were generated using the equations in  table 2  and the actual 
data for the independent variables during the forecast period. 
cast equipment  investment  higher  than its actual  value. In general,  these 
results show a net tendency toward underprediction  and thus are the 
reverse  of those obtained  by Kopcke,  who found that forecasts  of equip- 
ment investment  were above actual values in 1975 and 1976.27 Only 
during  late 1977 and 1978 are the forecasts  of the majority  of the five 
models  above  the actual  level of equipment  investment  and then by gen- 
27.  Kopcke, "Behavior  of Investment  Spending." Peter K. Clark  95 
Table  4. Estimated  and  Actual  Standard  Errors  of Forecast  for Investment  in Producers' 
Durable  Equipment  and  Nonresidential  Structures,  Alternative  Models, 1973:3-1978:4 
Percent  of potential  GNP 
Producers'  durable  Nonresidential 
equipment  structures 
Model  Estimated  Actual  Estimated  Actual 
Accelerator  0.23  0.25  0.20  0.54 
Accelerator-cash  flow  0.27  0.46  0.19  0.23 
Neoclassical  0.30  0.56  0.25  0.46 
Modified  neoclassical  0.27  0.56  0.15  0.45 
Securities  value  0.59  0.32  0.50  1.05 
Source: Same as table 1. The forecast errors were calculated using the equations in tables 1 and 2 and 
the actual data for the independent variables during the forecast period. The estimated standard errors 
of forecast are those presented in table 3 using the "many-periods-ahead"  calculation. The actual errors  are 
the ones consistent with the "many-periods-ahead"  estimates; that is, they do not include the correction for 
autocorrelation. 
erally  narrow  margins.  All in all, equipment  investment  since 1973 has 
not  been  lower  than  what  could  have  been  expected. 
The forecasts  for structures  tell a different  story,  as shown  in figure  3. 
Four of the five models substantially  overpredict  investment  for most of 
the 1973-78 period.  Although  the low explanatory  power of the equa- 
tions can be blamed for part of the difference  between predicted  and 
actual investment, the  actual divergence is  improbably  large when 
judged  by 1954-73 standards.  For example,  at the end  of 1974, the differ- 
ence  between  the observed  structures  investment  and  the accelerator  pre- 
diction is over 15 percent, two-and-a-half  times the standard  forecast 
error.  Structures  investment  fell much  faster  from  mid-1973  to mid-1975 
than  the equations  predict,  and then responded  sluggishly  to increases  in 
output  in 1976 and 1977. Only  in 1978 do the actual  values  start  to gain 
ground  on the forecasts,  moving closer to predicted  values. Aggregate 
structures  investment  from 1974 to 1978 was lower  than  would  have  been 
expected  in 1973, given the paths of output,  cash flow, and capital  cost 
during  those  years. 
The actual out-of-sample  deviations  for each equation  are compared 
with their  expected  values  in table 4. For equipment,  the accelerator  has 
the best forecasting  performance,  as expected from the within-sample 
statistics.  The forecasts  of the securities-value  model and the accelerator- 
cash flow model also have standard  deviations  that are less than twice 
their  estimated  value. 96  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1979 
The neoclassical and modified neoclassical models forecast signifi- 
cantly worse than expected,  indicating  that they may be subject  to the 
same sort of specification  error  that has been found in other studies.28 
For structures,  all the models  except  the accelerator-cash  flow exhibit 
significantly  higher  forecast  errors  than would have been expected  from 
the fit between  1954 and 1973. Because  no clear  reason  can be given  for 
why cash flow should be such an important  determinant  of structures 
investment  when  it fails  to add  explanatory  power  to the accelerator  model 
for equipment,  the most  plausible  conclusion  is that a shift  in demand  for 
nonresidential  structures  has occurred  that is not captured  by any of the 
five  models. 
A more stringent  test for shifts in investment  behavior  may be con- 
structed  by comparing  the sum of squared  residuals  for two regressions 
before  and after  mid-1973 with the sum of squared  residuals  for a single 
regression  for the entire  sample  period.  Such a test examines  both fore- 
cast errors  and functional  dependencies  that do not change  the forecast. 
The F-statistics  for such a test are given in table 5. For equipment,  the 
accelerator,  the accelerator-cash  flow, and the modified neoclassical 
models show no shift; for the accelerator  and accelerator-cash  flow 
models, this confirms  the forecasting  results.  The finding  of no shift in 
coefficients  for the modified  neoclassical  model is another  indication  of 
the  high  variance  of its estimated  coefficients. 
The F-statistics  for structures  also confirm  the results of the post- 
sample  forecast;  only the accelerator-cash  flow  model  shows  no shift.  The 
other  models  indicate  that  the relationship  between  structures  investment 
and its determinants  has changed  significantly  since 1973. 
A qualitative  understanding  of what has happened  to nonresidential 
fixed investment  can be obtained  by directly comparing  it to its deter- 
minants  over  the past seven  years,  as shown  in figure  4. Equipment  invest- 
ment follows a cyclical  pattern  that lags output,  as implied  by a flexible 
accelerator.  None of  the capital-cost variables explains the strength 
of equipment  purchases  relative to output in 1974 and early 1975: at 
the end of 1974, the rental  price of capital  services  for equipment  using 
28. Although coefficient estimates are not specifically given by Bischoff, experi- 
ments with his specifications  indicate that his equations fail to forecast well outside 
their estimation  interval. See his "Business  Investment  in the 1970s."  The same prob- 
lem is encountered in Kopcke, "Behavior of  Investment Spending," and in Ando 
and others, "On the Role of Expectations of Price and Technological Change in an 
Investment  Function." Peter K. Clark  97 
Table  S. Standard  Errors  of Estimate  for Equations  Estimating  Investment  in 
Producers'  Durable  Equipment  and  Nonresidential  Structures,  Alternative  Models, 
1954:1-1973:2 and 1954:1-1978:4, and F-Tests of the Equality  of the 
Estimated  Coefficients,  before  and  after 1973:2 
Standard  error  of estimate 
(percent  of potential  GNP) 
Model  and type  of 
investment  1954:1-1973:2  1954:1-1978:4  F-statistica 
Producers'  durable  equipment 
Accelerator  0.23  0.21  0.89 
Accelerator-cash  flow  0.23  0.21  0.49 
Neoclassical  0.30  0.36  4.40b 
Modified  neoclassical  0.19  0.18  1.28 
Securities  value  1.50  1.77  8.26b 
Nonresidenitial  structures 
Accelerator  0.19  0.27  15.30b 
Accelerator-cash  flow  0.19  0.16  0.06 
Neoclassical  0.26  0.29  3. 48b 
Modified  neoclassical  0.13  0.26  18.41b 
Securities  value  0.81  0.84  4.22b 
Source: Same as table 1, using the equation specifications of tables 1 and 2. 
a.  The calculated F-statistics do not include autocorrelation coefficients; that is, the estimated investment 
used in calculating the sums of squares does not include an autocorrelation correction. Since the auto- 
correlation coefficient is estimated, the F-tests are only asymptotic approximations. 
b. The coefficient differences  are significant at the 1 percent level. 
both fixed and variable  discount rates is close to its level of  1973:2. 
Deflated  cash flow and Q both fell precipitously  during  the same  period, 
so neither  can explain  the relatively  high value of equipment  investment. 
The question  for structures  is just the opposite: why did it fall so fast 
in 1974 and 1975, given its weak relationship  to output?  A similar  path 
is followed  by Q, but the limited  response  of structures  investment  to Q 
between  1954 and 1973 forces  the securities-value  equation  to overpredict 
between 1974 and 1978. The pronounced  dip in deflated  cash flow be- 
tween  the end of 1973 and the middle  of 1975 coincides  with the decline 
in structures  investment,  but does not explain the continuing  weakness 
in 1976 and 1977. 
Another  problem  with the structures  forecast  is that all the estimated 
equations  display fairly  large negative  residuals  in mid-1973; structures 
investment,  even  at its peak,  was  lower  than  historical  relationships  would 
indicate.  These negative  residuals  cause most of the forecasts  in figure  3 
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Figure  4. Components  of Nonresidential  Fixed Investment  and  Its Determinants, 
1972-78 
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a.  Only the rental price of capital services used in the equations for the modified neoclassical model is 
shows. The one used for the neoclassical model, with a constant before-tax rate of discount, showed little 
variation over the 1972-78 period. See appendix B for a description of these series. Peter K. Clark  99 
Table  6. Investment  in Nonresidential  Structures,  by Type, 1954-78 
Percent  of potential  GNP 
Commercial  Industrial 
Year  buiildinigs  buildings  All other 
1954  0.65  0.59  2.50 
1955  0.84  0.63  2.41 
1956  0.95  0.80  2.42 
1957  0.82  0.82  2.40 
1958  0.82  0.54  2.30 
1959  0.88  0.47  2.24 
1960  0.91  0.61  2.21 
1961  0.98  0.58  2.11 
1962  1.03  0.57  2.13 
1963  0.95  0.55  2.09 
1964  0.97  0.64  2.14 
1965  1.09  0.95  2.24 
1966  1.01  1.13  2.28 
1967  0.95  0.95  2.23 
1968  1.03  0.79  2.24 
1969  1.10  0.79  2.23 
1970  1.02  0.67  2.18 
1971  1.09  0.50  2.05 
1972  1.15  0.39  2.04 
1973  1.18  0.47  2.05 
1974  1.01  0.49  1.87 
1975  0.72  0.44  1.68 
1976  0.70  0.39  1.77 
1977  0.74  0.38  1.77 
1978  0.82  0.48  1.82 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, national income and product accounts. 
investment  theories  explain  the structures  aggregate  poorly  between  1954 
and  1973, and  do even  worse  between  1974 and 1978. 
THE  STRUCTURES  PUZZLE: 
CLUES  FROM DISAGGREGATED DATA 
Disaggregated  data on structures  investment  provide  a partial  expla- 
nation of the poor performance  observed since 1973. The two most 
interesting  components  are  commercial  and  industrial  buildings,  which  are 
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vestment  in commercial  structures  (as a fraction of potential GNP) 
displays a pronounced  upward  trend. In  1974, the effect of lowered 
occupancy  rates  in a number  of areas  was compounded  by falling  output 
and serious liquidity  problems  for a number  of real estate investment 
trusts, resulting  in a reduction  of almost $5 billion (1972  prices) in 
purchases  of commercial  structures  from 1973:2 to  1975:4. The re- 
mainder  of structures  investment  (with commercial  structures  excluded) 
is lower  than  its projected  value  by only about  $2 billion  in 1972 prices  (or 
one standard  error) for the years 1974-78.29 Thus, apart  from commer- 
cial structures,  no significant  deficiency  remains  to be explained. 
It is reasonable  to exclude  the commercial  component  from the struc- 
tures equations,  although  such "post-data  model construction"  can be 
faulted  on purely  statistical  grounds.  Expenditures  on commercial  struc- 
tures  seem  to be immune  to the standard  accelerator  effects;  for example, 
they did not decline at all during  the recession  of 1958. Higher  interest 
rates  in 1966 and 1970 had some effect,  but the upward  trend of com- 
mercial  structures  until 1973 was fairly  steady.  The post-1973 "bust"  in 
commercial  structures  can  be viewed  as a natural  reaction  to overbuilding 
and overextension  of credit.  By now, the glut of shopping  centers and 
office  space  produced  in the early  1970s has  been eliminated,  and  if credit 
is available,  investment  in commercial  structures  should  rise substantially 
in 1979 and 1980. 
Industrial  structures,  in sharp  contrast,  had a weak performance  dur- 
ing the late sixties  and early  seventies.  That weakness  contributed  to the 
sizable  negative  residual  of aggregate  structures  at the beginning  of the 
post-sample  period. As shown in table 6, as a percentage  of potential 
GNP, expenditures  on industrial  structures  (primarily  factory  buildings) 
fell from a Vietnam-inflated  peak of about 1 percent  in 1965-67 to an 
average  of roughly  one-half  of 1 percent  in 1970-73, and even less than 
that in 1974-78. While there was a resurgence  in 1978, the poor per- 
formance  of industrial  structures  may  be indicative  of problems  caused  by 
long-run  pessimism,  higher discount  rates, or regulatory  strangulation. 
Industrial  structures  are long-lived (tax lives of thirty  years,  useful lives 
even  longer), so that increases  in the discount  rate should  reduce  invest- 
ment  in structures  much more than investment  in equipment,  which  has 
a shorter  service life. "Horror"  stories about the regulatory  problems 
29. This estimate was made using a projection  from an annual accelerator  model 
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encountered  in building  "green  field" (new site) plants also find some 
support  in the current  low level of investment  in industrial  structures. 
One additional  explanation  for the low level of structures  investment 
is the possible  overdeflation  of current-dollar  figures  to obtain  constant- 
dollar estimates.  Nonresidential  structures  are heterogeneous,  making  it 
extremely  difficult  to measure  their  value in constant  dollars.  Because  of 
these measurement  problems,  the deflator  for nonresidential  structures 
is based (in part) on increases  in input prices, a procedure  that may 
underestimate  the extent to which inputs with rapidly rising relative 
prices (such as labor) can be contracted  by greater  use of other inputs 
whose  prices  are  rising  more  slowly. 
DISAGGREGATED  EQUIPMENT  INVESTMENT- 
ANOTHER  PUZZLE? 
While consideration  of the structures  investment  data on a piece-by- 
piece basis seems  to help explain  the behavior  of the structures  aggregate 
during  the 1973-78 period, exactly the opposite is true for equipment. 
While the equipment  aggregate  has followed its expected  path over the 
past five years,  its composition  has been radically  altered.  Particularly  in 
the last three  years,  the expansion  in equipment  investment  has primarily 
occurred  in motor  vehicles:  automobiles,  buses,  trucks,  and  truck  trailers, 
as shown  in table 7. Because  the ratio of motor  vehicles  to other  types  of 
equipment  varied  within  a fairly  limited  range  around  25 percent  between 
1954 and 1971, the major  rise  in 1976-78 is especially  surprising.  Indeed, 
the sharp  upturn  in the most  recent  interval  is much  larger  than  any  previ- 
ous variation.30 
It is tempting  to conclude  that  the sharp  upturn  in purchases  of motor 
vehicles  is part of the same phenomenon  that has weakened  investment 
in other  types of equipment  and in structures:  increasing  risk premiums 
and discount  rates have skewed investment  toward assets with shorter 
lives.  However,  the rising  proportion  of motor  vehicles  in total purchases 
cannot  be taken too seriously,  given two problems  with the data. First, 
30. Simple accelerator  models using annual data on vehicle and nonvehicle pur- 
chases indicate that the 1978 figure for motor vehicles is more than two standard 
deviations  high, and that the nonvehicle component is more than two standard  devia- 
tions low. Statistical analysis of the ratio of vehicles to nonvehicles is complicated 
by the fact that, under standard assumptions, it would have a noncentral Cauchy 
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Table  7. Investment  in Producers'  Durable  Equipment,  by Type, and  Ratio of Motor 
Vehicles  to All Other  Equipment,  1954-78 
Type  of equipment  (billions  of 1972 dollars) 
Motor vehicles  Ratio of 
motor  vehicles 
Buses, trucks,  to all other 
and truck  equipment 
Year  Automobiles  trailers  All other  (percent) 
1954  3.8  2.6  25.4  25.2 
1955  4.9  3.4  27.6  30.0 
1956  3.2  3.3  30.6  21.3 
1957  3.7  2.9  31.3  21.1 
1958  2.7  2.5  27.3  19.1 
1959  3.8  3.0  29.3  23.2 
1960  4.0  3.1  30.2  23.5 
1961  3.7  3.2  29.4  23.5 
1962  4.5  4.1  31.5  27.3 
1963  4.3  4.3  34.1  25.2 
1964  4.6  4.5  38.6  23.6 
1965  5.7  5.6  44.7  25.3 
1966  5.4  6.3  51.9  22.6 
1967  5.2  5.7  51.5  21.2 
1968  6.4  6.9  52.7  25.2 
1969  6.7  8.2  55.4  26.9 
1970  5.0  7.1  55.1  22.0 
1971  6.9  7.9  51.5  28.7 
1972  7.6  10.3  56.4  31.8 
1973  8.7  12.5  64.3  32.9 
1974  7.6  12.3  68.2  29.2 
1975  7.3  9.0  60.2  27.1 
1976  8.8  11.7  60.1  34.1 
1977  10.6  15.5  63.7  41.0 
1978  11.5  18.1  65.9  44.9 
Source: Same as table 6. 
the total for equipment  investment  is based on an average  of estimates 
from  two sources:  data  on commodity  flows  and  data from  the plant and 
equipment  survey.  The motor vehicles component  is not estimated  the 
same way, but is instead based on what the U.S. Department  of Com- 
merce  considers  to be more reliable  data on sales and units. In the past 
three  years, data on commodity  flows have indicated  higher  investment 
than the plant and equipment  survey;  the compromise  total in the na- 
tional accounts  is thus smaller  than would have been estimated  if the Peter  K. Clark  103 
commodity-flow  method  had been used exclusively.  Because  the method 
for estimating  motor vehicle purchases  is closer to the commodity-flow 
approach,  the divergence  between the estimates from the plant and 
equipment  survey and those from the commodity-flow  method may be 
responsible  for a substantial  fraction  of the apparent  rise in motor ve- 
hicles  relative  to the total. Moreover,  the method  used to allocate  private 
purchases  of automobiles  and trucks  between  investment  and consump- 
tion could be subject  to a wide margin  of error.  The steep rise in motor 
vehicles investment  is a puzzle, but at this point it would be a mistake 
to attach  any  major  significance  to it. 
1973-78  INVESTMENT  PERFORMANCE:  CONCLUSIONS 
The results  of estimating  and comparing  the forecasts  of the various 
models can be summarized  by answering  the questions  raised at the be- 
ginning  of the paper.  First, and probably  most important,  business  fixed 
investment  in the aggregate  is only a little lower than might have been 
expected  from its historical  relationship  to output and capital cost. In 
fact, the two minor surprises  for equipment  investment  are that it did 
not fall further  in 1974 and 1975, and that  it has risen despite  a stagnant 
stock  market  in the past two years.  The structures  component  of business 
fixed investment  has been between $7 billion and $10 billion (1972 
prices)  below  projected  levels since 1975, but most  of this shortfall  can  be 
attributed  to commercial  overbuilding  in the early 1970s and  the collapse 
of the market  for these structures  in 1974. High rates of investment  in 
motor  vehicles  combined  with  low investment  in other  types  of equipment 
and  in industrial  structures  give some credibility  to the argument  that  risk 
premiums  have  risen  over  the past  five  years,  biasing  expenditures  toward 
investment  with shorter  lifetimes.  However,  the strength  of business  fixed 
investment  as a whole indicates  that a major  deviation  from  past  relation- 
ships  has  not yet appeared. 
Second, output is clearly the primary  determinant  of nonresidential 
fixed  investment.  Among  the equipment  equations,  the simple  accelerator 
has the lowest estimated  forecast error;  this statistic  is confirmed  by a 
superior  performance  in the post-sample  forecasts.  While the modified 
neoclassical model (with its  extra variables) fits the historical data 
better,  it does so at the expense of high variances  of coefficients,  which 
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The rental  price  of capital  services,  a conglomeration  of interest  rates 
and tax variables,  is not very helpful in explaining  quarterly  data on 
business  fixed investment  in the United States over the past twenty-five 
years. This result  should  not be interpreted  as a rejection  of the role of 
prices  in the determination  of business  investment;  no reasonable  econo- 
mist would argue  that a refundable  tax credit  of, say, 20 percent  would 
not increase  the demand  for investment  in the long run.  Rather,  it means 
that the effect of interest  rates and tax changes  must be estimated  with 
more comprehensive  data than the quarterly  aggregates,  and that these 
effects  are likely to be felt only gradually,  over long periods  of time. For 
short-term  forecasting  (two years or less), the effect  of moderate  varia- 
tions in taxes and interest rates is likely to be negligible;  over longer 
periods  it may be substantial,  but cannot be estimated  with any degree 
of accuracy  from  equations  relating  the quarterly  aggregates. 
The primary  implication  of these results  for economic  policy is that 
there  is no quick  and easy  way to channel  aggregate  demand  toward  non- 
residential  fixed investment.  The response  of investment  to direct  incen- 
tives may be both slower and weaker  than was indicated  by Bischoff's 
model.  In the short  run,  at least, the best way to keep  investment  spending 
up is to keep  capacity  utilization  high. 
The  Investment  Outlook  through  1981 
To investigate  the possibilities for business fixed investment  from 
1979 to  1981, conditional forecasts were made with the accelerator 
model  for equipment  and  with the accelerator-cash  flow model for struc- 
tures. The optimistic  scenario is based on the Carter administration's 
forecast  and projections  for 1979-81. In it, real GNP grows slowly but 
does not decline  over the next three  years.3'  The pessimistic  alternative  is 
a model simulation  by Data Resources, Inc., which forecasts faster 
growth  in the first  half of 1979, eventually  followed  by a year-long  reces- 
31.  See Economic Report of the President, January 1979, pp. 97-106;  and The 
Budget of the Utnited  States Government,  Fiscal Year 1980, pp. 34-36. The adminis- 
tration is always careful to put ranges around its point estimates and stress that they 
are based on assumptions  that may turn out to be false. The actual estimates used 
for the investment  forecasts below are derived  from the Data Resources, Inc. simula- 
tion CARTERCOUNTRY0126,  which is in turn based on the economic assumptions 
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Table  8. Projected  Output  and  Cash  Flow under  Optimistic  and  Pessimistic 
Assumptions,  1979:2-1981:4a 
Billions  of 1972 dollars 
Gross  national  product  Cash  flow 
Year  and 
quarter  Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic 
1979:2  1,433.0  1,439.3  121.1  116.5 
4  1,443.2  1,449.4  120.7  115.0 
1980:2  1,464.7  1,404.6  123.9  111.7 
4  1,489.0  1,387.9  130.7  113.3 
1981:2  1,524.4  1,451.0  131.7  121.1 
4  1,558.8  1,489.0  136.5  124.9 
Sources: Derived from simulations of Data Resources, Inc. The optimistic forecasts are based on those 
in Economic  Report of the President,  January  1979, pp. 97-106; and The Budget  of the United  States Govern- 
ment, Fiscal  Year 1980, pp. 34-36.  The pessimistic forecasts assume a  year-long recession in 1980. See 
Data Resources  Review, vol. 8 (February 1979). The cash-flow variable is described  in table 1, note a. 
a.  In 1978:4, real GNP and real cash flow were $1,414.7 billion and $118.5 billion, respectively. 
Table  9. Projected  Nonresidential  Fixed Investment  under  Optimistic  and  Pessimistic 
Assumptions,  1979:2-1981:4a 
Billions  of 1972 dollars 
Producers'  durable  equipment  Nonresidential  structures 
Year  and 
quarter  Optimistic  Pessimistic  Optimistic  Pessimistic 
1979:2  102.0  102.6  46.7  46.8 
4  104.5  105.9  46.1  46.3 
1980:2  108.0  103.1  45.1  43.7 
4  108.8  95.6  45.3  41.2 
1981:2  111.9  97.2  46.0  40.8 
4  116.2  102.0  i46.9  41.9 
Sources: Same as table 8. The equations used to forecast investment are shown in the text. 
a.  In  1978:4, real investment in producers' durable equipment and in nonresidential structures were 
$98.2 billion and $46.7 billion, respectively. 
sion  in 1980.32  The alternative  assumed  paths  for output  and  cash  flow  and 
the resulting  forecasts  for equipment  and structures  investment  are given 
in tables  8 and 9, respectively.  The equations  used to generate  the invest- 
ment forecasts  were estimated  using data from 1954 to 1978, where  IE 
and  IS are  investment  in producers'  durable  equipment  and  nonresidential 
structures,  respectively,  and KE and KS are the corresponding  capital 
32. The model simulation used was DEEPRECESSION0124. See the Data Re- 
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stock variable.33  (Here and elsewhere  the numbers  in parentheses  are 
standard  errors.) 
IE  20  y-  KE__ 
yp  =  -11.6+  b8  yYp  s  + 0.187 
(2.0)  8=0  (0.013) 
Durbin-Watson  =  1.94; standard  error =  0.00124; rho =  0.81; 
selected lag coefficients:  bo =  0.084, b4 =  0.172, b8 =  0.144, b12 =  0.092, b16 =  0.049, 
b2O =  0.031. 
Is  20  A yL  16  CF  KS 
-6.5  (  `1b  2  p-+0.0)7KS1  yp 
(2.0) 
0  I  8  . 
y 
Durbin-Watson  =  1.98; standard  error =  0.00082;  rho =  0.86; 
selected  lag coefficients:  bo  = 0.026,  b4 = 0.060, bs = 0.036,  b12  =  -0.001,  b16 =-0.005, 
16 
b2=  =-0.004;  C4  =  -0.004,  C8 =  0.021, c12 = 0.024, c16  =  -0.014;  L  c, =  0.228. 
8-1 
Ulnder  the administration's  assumption  of slow but steady  growth  and 
declining  inflation,  nonresidential  fixed investment  rises at an average 
rate  of about  4.3 percent  per  year,  roughly  consistent  with  the administra- 
tion's  projections.34  Most of the increase  is in equipment,  with structures 
remaining  at about  their current  level. If the earlier  discussion  analyzing 
the special  nature  of commercial  structures  has any  validity,  the  projection 
for total  structures  may  be low;  it is easy  to envision  commercial  structures 
continuing  their  rise  in response  to lower  vacancy  rates. 
Under the "DEEPRECESSION"  scenario of Data Resources, Inc., 
however,  the outlook for nonresidential  fixed investment  is much  worse. 
The equipment  plus structures  total is almost 5 percent  less in 1980:4 
than  the level attained  in 1978:4. Instead  of continuing  to rise, the ratio 
of business  fixed investment  to potential  GNP falls to 9.0 percent,  sub- 
33.  These two equations were used because they had the best performance  in the 
post-sample forecasts discussed above. Forecasts with the other models generate 
results consistent with their 1973-78 forecasting behavior. For example, the mod- 
ified neoclassical model predicts a wider swing in equipment  investment  in the reces- 
sion scenario, while the neoclassical model shows little response to  variations in 
output. The securities-value  model has almost no forecasting capability because it 
requires  a stock market  forecast. 
34.  See the 1979 Economic Report, pp. 97-99. The investment forecasts are not 
determined simultaneously with output; the investment forecasts in tables 8 and 9 
could be either higher or lower than the investment  component of aggregate  demand 
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stantially  below  the level required  to sustain  even moderate  growth  of the 
ratio  of capital  to labor. 
All the evidence  indicates  that output  will be the primary  deterninant 
of business  fixed  investment  over the next three  years.  If a recession  can 
be avoided  and capacity  utilization  remains  high, as in the Carter  admin- 
istration's  optimistic  scenario,  then business  fixed investment  will con- 
tinue  to rise, approximately  maintaining  its fraction  of total output.  Con- 
versely,  if rising prices and high interest  rates put the economy into a 
tailspin,  the percentage  of nonresidential  fixed  investment  in total output 
will fall, with adverse  consequences  for future  productivity  and inflation. 
APPENDIX  A 
Issues in the Estimation  of Investment  Models 
THE  FOLLOWING  NOTES  elaborate  on several  analytical  issues relevant 
to the estimation  of investment  models. 
The  Direction  of Causation 
Nonresidential  fixed  investment  is only one of the components  of out- 
put that can reasonably  be called "investment";  residential  structures, 
consumer  durables,  and some components  of government  output  are also 
deferrals  of present  consumption  for future output. Thus, while in the 
aggregate  "investment"  can rise only if "saving"  is also increased,  the 
total for ex post saving  can be allocated  in a number  of ways, depending 
on the relative  demand  for each component.  The effect of increased  in- 
vestment  demand  on output,  interest  rates, and prices  is clearly  a prob- 
lem for any equation  for aggregate  investment  demand,  but perhaps  not 
a major  problem  when  only a part  of total investment  is being estimated. 
In addition,  regressions  of investment  on future  and past changes  in out- 
put indicate  that output  is exogenous  in the Granger-Sims  sense.35  In a 
35.  C. W. J. Granger, "Investigating  Causal Relations by Econometric Models 
and Cross-Spectral  Methods,"  Econometrica, vol. 37 (July 1969), pp. 424-38; and 
Christopher  A. Sims, "Money,  Income and Causality,"  American Economic Review, 
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test for the effect  on investment  of output  changes  over eight  future  quar- 
ters,  the  values  of the  F-statistic  are 1.49 for equipment  and  0.35 for struc- 
tures, both far below the 2.77 value that would be significant  at the 5 
percent  level. 
Level  versus  Change  in Output 
The accelerator  model (equation  5) is estimated  by specifying  invest- 
ment as a distributed  lag on past changes in output as indicated  by the 
theory.  This  formulation  contrasts  with  recent  estimates  of the accelerator, 
which  specify  investment  as a function  of the level of output,36  as given  in 
equation  A-1: 
I  a  N+1  IL8  K1 
(A-1)  ?+  E  n8  yp8  +  d  + u. 
Equations  5 and A-1 differ  by only one linear  restriction;  if 5 is the true 
relationship,  then 
no =  bo, nl =  bl-bo,  ...,nN  =  bN-bNl,  nN+  bN. 
A test of this linear restriction  indicates that it is met almost exactly. 
While the differences  formulation  (equation  5) is robust  with respect  to 
the specification  of the polynomial  distributed  lag, the levels formulation 
(equation  A-1) is more  sensitive.  This  is because  the  polynomial  restriction 
requires  some  degree  of smoothness  in the b, coefficients:  if bo  and  b, have 
similar  values  that are not close to zero, specifying  a low-degree  polyno- 
mial  for the  ns  coefficients  can  seriously  distort  the accelerator. 
The Constant  Term  in the Accelerator  Equation 
According  to a simple  interpretation  of equation  5, the constant  term 
should  be zero, and the coefficient  of the capital  stock should  equal the 
annual  depreciation  rate. There  are two reasons  why this is not the case. 
First,  the depreciation  behavior  of the net capital  stock  figures  is only ap- 
proximately  exponential.  If depreciation  is exponential,  then: 
(A-2)  K =  (1 -8)K1  +  I,  or  K-I  =  (1-  )Ku. 
36. For example, see Bischoff, "Business  Investment  in the 1970s," and Kopcke, 
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Thus  in a regression  of the capital  stock minus  investment  on the capital 
stock  lagged  one year,  the constant  term  should  also be zero. Instead,  the 
constant  terms  are  found  to differ  significantly  from  zero when  the follow- 
ing  equation  is fitted  over  the 1948-78 period: 
K  -I  a 
__b__  U  yp  yp  +byp-+u. 
The  key  coefficients  are 
Coefficient 
a  b 
Producers'  durable  equipment  6.00  0.827 
(0.45)  (0.002) 
Nonresidential  structures  -1.81  0.947 
(0.25)  (0.001) 
It is to be expected  that the coefficients  on the constant  terms  here are of 
opposite signs from those obtained in the estimates  of equation 5, as 
shown  in tables  1 and  2. 
For equipment,  the depreciation  rate is higher  in later years than in 
earlier  years;  note that with a constant  term, the estimated  depreciation 
rate is 8 =  a-/K1  +  (1  -  b),  which rises as K1  rises. For structures, 
the reverse  is true.37 
Deviation  from  exponential  depreciation  explains  only part  of the con- 
stant term in either the structures  or equipment  accelerator  equations. 
The other  part  of each constant  is related  to the output  term.  A negative 
constant  term in  the estimate  of equation 5 for equipment  allows the 
accelerator  effect  to be stronger,  generating  larger  investment  changes  for 
a change  in output.  As long as the equation  is given  a dynamic  interpreta- 
tion, such an increase  in the output  response  offset by a negative  constant 
term is perfectly  reasonable.38  The reverse  is true in the corresponding 
structures  equation:  the constant  term  is positive.  The accelerator  effect  is 
smaller,  generating  less investment  response  to changes  in output.  A visual 
37.  The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis calculates net capital stocks by using 
straight-line  depreciation  over an assumed asset life for each type of asset. There is 
an additional  complication  caused by asset transfers  between the business  and house- 
hold sectors. Thus exponential  depreciation  is only a convenient approximation. 
38. If an accelerator  is viewed as an adjustment  to some static equilibrium,  then 
if changes in output are zero, net investment  should be zero also. A negative constant 
in this context implies that constant output would result in negative net investment, 
an inconsistent  result. 110  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1979 
inspection  of the data for output,  structures  investment,  and equipment 
investment  would have yielded similar  results;  structures  investment  re- 
sponds only weakly to changes  in output, while equipment  investment 
swings  more  widely  over  the  business  cycle. 
The  Fit of the  Neoclassical  Equation 
The  performance  of the neoclassical  equations  is disappointing.  A pos- 
sible reason  for that poor performance  may be that the calculated  series 
for the rental  price  of capital  services  varies  much  more  than  its expected 
future  value.  Changes  in the interest  rate,  dividend-price  ratio,  or even  the 
corporate  tax rate probably  change expectations  slowly. The problem 
may  be characterized,  then, as a case of errors  in variables,  with the cal- 
culated  rental  price  of capital  services  varying  in some erratic  way around 
the expected value used by investment  decisionmakers.  This variation 
probably  biases the h8 coefficients  toward  zero, raising  the coefficient  on 
capital  stock (essentially  a trend  term), and  increasing  the standard  error 
of estimate. 
The effect  of the rental  price  of capital  services  can  be seen  most  clearly 
by considering  a more  general  model  that  includes  the neoclassical  model 
and  the accelerator  model  as special  cases: 
(A-3)  +  -qs  ] 
+ d Kp  + u, 
where  v is the elasticity  of substitution  between  capital  and labor  in pro- 
duction.  Equation  A-3 reduces to the accelerator  model (equation 5) 
when  V is zero, and to the neoclassical  model (equation  9) when  v is one. 
The  equation  can  be derived  from  an analysis  similar  to that  of Jorgenson 
when the production  function exhibits a constant  elasticity  of substitu- 
tion.39 
The standard  error  of estimate  for equation  A-3 as a function  of q is 
shown  in table  A-1. 
39. Jorgenson,  "Theory  of Investment  Behavior." Peter K. Clark  111 
Table  A-1. Standard  Error  of Estimate  from Equation  A-3 as a Function  of the 
Elasticity  of Substitution,  for Investment  in Producers'  Durable  Equipment  and 
Nonresidential  Structures,  1954:1-1973:2 
Percent  of potential  GNP 
Producers'  durable  equipment  Nonresidenitial  structures 
Elasticity  of 
substitution,  7  Adjusteda  Unadjustedb  Adjusteda  Unadjustedb 
-0.50  0.154  0.383c  0.089  0.2350 
-0.25  0.124  0.232  0.088  0.213c 
0.00  0.123  0.227  0.087  0.191 
0.25  0.130d  0.2730  0.087  0.196d 
0.50  0.1380  0.2910  0.087  0.186 
0.75  0.1450  0.298c  0.088  0.2430 
1.00  0.1500  0.301c  0.089  0.2580 
1.25  0.153c  0.302c  0.090d  0.2640 
1.50  0.1550  0.3030  0.091d  0.2650 
Source:  -Same as table 1. 
a.  Estimated standard error of e, where eu  -  pu-i. 
b. Estimated standard error of u. 
c.  Increase in standard error (asymptotically) significant at 1 percent level. 
d. Increase in standard error (asymptotically) significant at 5 percent level. 
For equipment,  the accelerator  model (y equal  to zero) performs  best; 
even small  positive  values  for the elasticity  of substitution  are rejected  by 
the data. The -0.25  value for V can be ruled  out on theoretical  grounds 
because a negative  value for v implies  that the investment  tax credit or 
accelerated  depreciation  actually  decreases  the capital  stock in the long 
run. The results  for structures  are not as sharp;  a value of 0.5 for the 
elasticity  of substitution  does insignificantly  better  than  the simple  accele- 
rator.  It is interesting  to note that the autocorrelation-adjusted  standard 
error contains almost no information  about the value of q. Evidently 
equation  A-3 fits poorly enough in the range (0 < V < 0.5)  that the 
poorer  fit  for other  values  of y can  be offset  by a slightly  higher  autocorre- 
lation  coefficient. 
A test analogous  to the one performed  in table A-1 cannot be con- 
structed  for the modified  neoclassical  model because  when the elasticity 
of substitution  approaches  zero, the regressor  matrix  becomes singular. 
However,  experimentation  with a generalized  version  of equation  11 in- 
dicates  that lower values of the elasticity  of substitution  may be appro- 
priate,  and  that  the "errors  in variables"  argument  made  for the neoclassi- 
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APPENDIX  B 
Construction  of the Rental  Price  of Capital  Services 
THE  FOLLOWING  is a description  of the variables  used in the estimation 
of the series  on the rental  price  of capital  services,  C. For equipment,  it is 
Cr  pE * (bE  +  r) * (1-JMlR  C-D  *  ZE  * U * RITC-ZE*  /U) 
(1-U) 
and  for structures, 
C = Ps *  (bs +  r)(  -  ZS .  U) 
(1-  U) 
where 
=  depreciation  rate for net nonresidential  stock of producers' 
durable equipment; estimated by  regression,  bE =  14.91 
percent  a year 
bs =  depreciation  rate for net stock of nonresidential  structures; 
estimated by regression, bs  =  5.82 percent a year 
D =  dummy  variable,  equal to 1.0 when the Long amendment  to 
the Revenue  Act of 1962  on depreciation  of the  investment  tax 
credit  was in effect  in 1962  and 1963,  and zero thereafter 
PE =  deflator  for nonresidential  investment  in producers'  durable 
equipment (1972 =  1.00) 
Ps =  deflator for investment  in  nonresidential  structures  (1972 
=  1.00) 
r =  discount  rate40 
40.  For the neoclassical model, r =  0.2(1 -  U),  the series used in Hall and Jor- 
genson, "Application of  the Theory of  Optimal Capital Accumulation." For  the 
modified neoclassical model, r =  (1.5  r,t,,k  +  1.5 rbOnd)  ( 1-  0.2U), an average of 
the results  obtained by Ando and others, "On  the Role of Expectations  of Prices and 
Technological Change in an Investment Function." The r8,t,k  term is the ratio of 
dividend  to price for the Standard  and Poor's 500 index; the rbOfld  term is the Baa 
corporate  bond rate minus the expected rate of inflation.  Following Ando and others, 
the expected rate of inflation is a constant 1 percent a year through 1964, and for 
subsequent  years equals 
(  0.87i  (  )/E0.87i) 
s-O  p  _,  sto 
where  (A)  is the  annual  rate  of change  of the deflator  for private  output  lagged  i 
P  ui 
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RITC =  rate of investment  tax credit  on equipment  investment 
U =  corporate  tax rate, defined  as the highest marginal  rate on 
corporate  income 
ZE = present  value of a dollar's  worth of depreciation  on equip- 
ment, a combination  of sum-of-the-digits  and straight-line 
depreciation 
ZS = present  value  of a dollar's  worth  of depreciation  on structures. 
The deflators,  PE and  ps,  are from the Bureau  of Economic  Analysis, 
national  income  and  product  accounts;  RITC  is the Data Resources,  Inc., 
series  for the investment  tax credit,  except  for a modification  in 1969; U, 
ZE, and ZS are derived  from data supplied  by the U.S. Department  of 
the Treasury. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Alan Greenspan:  Clark  has presented  an interesting  analysis  of various 
approaches  to investment.  I found the results  quite useful, and consider 
some of the results  of the models for equipment  especially  illuminating. 
I must say that, as I read the paper,  however,  answers  were not forth- 
coming  to a number  of questions  that I had expected  to be addressed. 
Also, I was struck  by the implicit assumption  in the paper that invest- 
ment  in equipment  and investment  in structures  are determined  indepen- 
dently,  even  though  their  determinants  are  modeled  similarly. 
In fact, we know that that is not the way appropriations  are imple- 
mented  at the corporate  level.  The appropriations  committees  or plant  and 
equipment  committees  within businesses rarely, if ever, focus on the 
question  of structures  versus  equipment  per se. Essentially  those commit- 
tees consider  projects that invariably  have certain mixes of plant and 
equipment.  In many instances,  there are actually  problems  of defining 
where  to split one from the other. Obviously  a strong interdependence 
between  plant and equipment  exists, especially  in a period  of significant 
capacity  expansion,  partly  because  building  a plant requires  equipment 
to go into  it. 
It is my  impression  that,  if Clark  fitted  relationships  to the  sum  of equip- 
ment  and structures,  the results  of his "horse  race"  among  models  would 
come out somewhat  differently.  In particular,  I suspect that the per- 
formance  of the Q relationships  would probably  improve;  while Q per- 
forms  terribly  in equations  for both equipment  and plant, the residuals 
suggest  that  combining  them  would  give a significantly  better  fit. 
I believe that the way the system really functions  is that aggregate 
plant and equipment  or, more precisely, aggregate  appropriations,  are 
determined  at any  particular  time  by the variables  specified  in the models, 
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while other  forces  determine  the internal  structure  of capital  formation- 
the composition  of plant and equipment  and of various  subcategories  of 
investment. 
I suspect  that the division  between  equipment  and  structures  is merely 
part  of the break  between  long-lived  and  short-lived  assets.  The key issue 
is not whether  the investment  is, in fact, plant  or equipment,  but whether 
it is a short-lived  asset with a rapid return  or a long-lived  asset in which 
much  of the potential  or expected  cash  flow  comes  from  the later  years  of 
the project. 
If the latter  is the case,  the recent  behavior  of both  structures  and  motor 
vehicles  can be explained  in terms  of shifting  hurdle  rates of return.  Al- 
though  the data are not easy to obtain,  the pattern  of investment  clearly 
suggests  a significant  increase  in the hurdle  rate of return  in the 1970s, 
especially  in the mid-decade.  It is clear  that the higher  the hurdle  rate of 
return,  other things  being equal, the greater  the present  value of short- 
lived assets  relative  to long-lived  assets.  Thus  a rise  in hurdle  rates  should 
skew the distribution  of the lives of capital goods toward  shorter-lived 
assets.  One consequence  would  be a smaller  proportion  of structures  and 
a larger proportion  of motor vehicles-a  prediction  supported  by the 
data. Further  confirmation  can be found in the distribution  of research 
and development  expenditures,  which  have  many  of the characteristics  of 
capital  investment.  Excluding  government-financed  research  and  develop- 
ment, the proportion  of long-lived  research,  relative  to short-payoff  de- 
velopment  expenditures,  should  fall in a period  of rising  hurdle  rates of 
return.  And that can explain the virtual  drying  up of privately  financed 
basic research,  especially  in industry.  While there  are a number  of other 
explanations,  such as the effect of government  regulation,  I am reason- 
ably confident  that a careful look at individual  budgetary  procedures 
would reveal  that high hurdle  rates, stemming  from high risk  premiums, 
are  the major  explanation. 
What I know about investment  decisionmaking  causes me to doubt 
statistical  procedures  that make plant or equipment  expenditures  the 
dependent  variable  and then estimate  distributed  lags on a number  of ex- 
planatory  variables.  Can such equations  track the process that actually 
occurs?  Capital  expenditure  committees  of corporations  act  on appropria- 
tions in the light of variables  such as cash flow, Q, or some accelerator 
measure.  The lag between  those factors  and appropriations  is short.  And 
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Almon lags are helpful  in fitting  such relationships,  they clearly  do not 
follow a fixed  lag distribution  as the Almon  lag implies.  By making  invest- 
ment  expenditures  the dependent  variable  and  linking  them  by a fixed  lag 
distribution  to the factors  that actually  determine  capital  appropriations, 
the models waste information  and turn into reduced  forms rather  than 
structural  explanations.  I would urge researchers  on capital  spending  to 
take a more careful  and detailed  look at the appropriations-expenditure 
process. 
Next, I want to mention  some data problems.  There is an interesting 
table in the Survey  of Current  Business (March 1979, p. 6)  that raises 
major questions  about the quality of the relevant data. The published 
figures  on nonresidential  fixed investment  are essentially  an average  of 
two methods of estimation-one based on the plant and equipment  sur- 
vey and the other on "commodity  flow."  For 1977 and 1978, the pub- 
lished  figures  show  increases  in nominal  expenditures  of 15.7 percent  and 
16.9 percent,  respectively.  Yet the estimate  based  on the plant  and  equip- 
ment survey  rose only 12.5 percent  in 1977 and 11.8 percent  in 1978, 
while the commodity-flow  procedure  indicates  much larger  increases  of 
18.1 and 18.8 percent,  respectively,  for the two years.  Although  earlier 
years  do not show  that  much  divergence,  these are  significant  differences. 
A model to forecast  numbers  is fine, but it is disturbing  to remain  so 
uncertain  about  the meaning  of the numbers  we are forecasting. 
On a minor issue, I have reservations  about any classification  that 
groups  the structures  of nonprofit  institutions  and churches  with those of 
manufacturing  firms and public utilities. I would not expect these sub- 
categories  to be related  to Q in the same  way and  to the same  extent. 
A problem  also arises  with leased equipment.  Apart  from  taxes, theo- 
retically  it should  make  no difference  whether  the ultimate  user  purchases 
the asset or rents it from someone else who does the purchasing.  But I 
suspect  that, with the significant  shift in recent  years toward  equipment 
leasing-mainly from  commercial  bank  holding  companies-the determi- 
nants  of capital  investment  in that area may be changing.  I also wonder 
whether  leased  equipment  may  account  for some  of the difference  between 
the estimates  based  on the plant  and  equipment  survey  and  those  from  the 
commodity-flow  approach. 
Two other analytical  issues remain.  First, no believer in  structural 
models  can be comfortable  with Clark's  explanation  of the sharp  decline 
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but I want  to stress  that  it is not grounded  in any model. Such an abrupt 
and major change should be tracked  by any model worth its salt. If a 
model cannot do that, one must seriously  question  whether  it has any 
value. 
Second,  I am troubled  by the distinction  between  short-run  and long- 
run investment  models. It seems reasonable  to conclude  from the paper 
that  output-determined  models  are  appropriate  and  provide  the  best  fit  for 
five years, but that they cannot  be conceptually  applicable  to the longer 
term.  But then we need some way to move (perhaps  by a phase-in  pro- 
cedure) from  a short-term  model  to a long-term  one. I am uncomfortable 
with the implication  that a valuable  short-term  forecasting  device exists, 
which,  carried  out to the longer  term,  arrives  at a contradiction.  It raises 
serious  questions  about  whether  one is capturing  the forces  that drive  the 
system.  That  discomfort  is relieved  if one can believe  the securities-value, 
or Q, model because  that theory  is consistent  in the short  term and long 
term. With plant and equipment  combined,  perhaps  it would show up 
better  in the  horse  race. 
Stephen  M. Goldfeld: Peter Clark  is to be commended  for providing  us 
with a comprehensive  and carefully  executed econometric  study of in- 
vestment  behavior.  In keeping  with  the Easter-Passover  season,  the paper 
begins with "the four questions"  which, in this spirit, might be para- 
phrased  "why  is the investment  equation  different  from all other  macro- 
econometric  equations  that seem unstable  in recent years?"  To answer 
this question,  Clark  estimates  five competing  models of investment  for a 
sample  period ending  in mid-1973. These estimates,  which are reported 
separately  for equipment  and structures,  are then extrapolated  through 
1978, providing  a basis both for a further  comparison  of the alternative 
models and for evaluating  whether  recent  investment  spending  is weaker 
than  might  have  been  expected,  given  its determinants. 
On this latter score, Clark concludes that equipment  investment  is 
roughly  on track  but that  investment  in structures  is somewhat  lower  than 
what  might  be expected.  Clark  clearly  prefers  the accelerator  to any  model 
utilizing  a cost of capital  variable,  and indicates  that the rental  price of 
capital  has no role to play in explaining  quarterly  data on investment.  I 
will concentrate  my remarks  on examining  these  two issues,  focusing  first 
on the cost  of capital. 
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ble) and the accelerator  model do a reasonable  job of explaining  invest- 
ment in equipment  through  mid-1973. However,  because these models 
are  nonnested-that is, neither  is a special  case of the other-it  is slightly 
problematic  to choose between  them.  Standard  errors  within  the sample 
favor  the modified  neoclassical  model, but a forecasting  criterion  (mea- 
sured  either  by anticipated  forecast  errors  or actual  forecasts)  reverses  the 
ranking,  leading  Clark  to prefer  the accelerator  model.  While  forecasting 
ability  is a reasonable  criterion  for model choice, the particular  evidence 
Clark  presents  may be a bit limited. First, it focuses on only a single 
forecasting  episode; and second, it assesses  forecasting  accuracy  in the 
context  of an individual  equation  and not a complete  model.  Apart  from 
these points, however,  there are a number  of other reasons  for caution 
before  dismissing  a rental  price  variable.  In explaining  the apparent  failure 
of this variable,  Clark  suggests  that a good part  of the problem  may stem 
from  his inability  to measure  properly  the cost of capital  due,  for example, 
to such things  as measurement  error,  aggregation  bias, or inadequate  in- 
formation  on expectations.  Because  these difficulties  plague  most macro- 
econometric  efforts,  the distinguishing  feature  of the present  case is that 
the variable  of concern does not seem to "work"  and, if we believe it 
should,  we have to ask what might  be done about  it. A number  of possi- 
bilities  can  be raised. 
The first  concerns  alternative  measures  of the rental  price  variable.  It 
is not difficult  to develop a number  of proxies  for the cost of capital- 
based,  for example,  on alternative  measures  of expected  inflation-which 
are needed  to estimate  a real rate  of return.  Clark  tried  with  little success 
but hardly  exhausted  the possibilities.  In this regard  there  may be some 
mileage  in rethinking  the way inflation  affects  the depreciation  adjust- 
ment.  In general,  it is not clear  to me that  the conventional  cost-of-capital 
variable  is well-suited  to cope with the kinds  of institutional  changes  that 
can emerge  in a world  of rapid  inflation.  Another  possibility,  touched  on 
by Alan Greenspan,  is that the cost-of-capital  variable  may need to be 
modified  by inclusion  of a risk  premium.  Certainly  numerous  stories  point 
in this  direction. 
There  are also a number  of econometric  issues concerning  this varia- 
ble. If, for example, measurement  error  is taken seriously,  it might be 
more appropriate  to rely on instrumental  variable  techniques.  Another 
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introduced.  Clark  explores  this in the context  of the neoclassical  model, 
but more could probably  be done. A third  econometric  issue is the high 
degree of serial correlation,  which in fact is evident in all the model 
specifications.  This somewhat  complicates  model comparisons  and fore- 
casting  exercises  because different  answers  may be found depending  on 
whether  an equation  is given  "credit"  for the serial  correlation  coefficient. 
Perhaps,  more importantly,  the  high degree of serial correlation  also 
raises suspicions that there may be some omitted variables in the spec- 
ifications. 
On  balance,  then,  a number  of caveats  apply  to Clark's  pessimistic  con- 
clusion concerning  the role of a cost-of-capital  variable.  However,  even 
after  a number  of alternatives  are  tried,  it may  be the case that  one cannot 
pin  down  the effect  of a rental  price  variable  with  aggregate  quarterly  time- 
series data. The preferred  strategy  may be the imposition  of some prior 
constraints  on the impact of the rental price variable.  Such constraints 
have  been utilized  with  some  success  in conjunction  with  mixed  estimation 
techniques  in a number  of recent  studies  of the financial  sector.  They  may 
well be necessary  in the present  context  to make quarterly  models  more 
useful  for policy  purposes. 
The second  major  issue that  I shall address  is whether  investment  is or 
has been "surprisingly"  weak. The answer  could well depend on one's 
preferred  specification  because that serves as a standard  for evaluating 
actual  investment.  To the extent  that  one's  preferred  specification  depends 
on forecasting  performance,  there is some built-in  bias toward  the con- 
clusion  that investment  is on track.  Put another  way, it is important  that 
the degree  of surprise  be evaluated  relative  to the information  available 
prior  to the forecast  period. 
As indicated  earlier,  for equipment  the two leading  candidates  would 
be the accelerator  and  the modified  neoclassical  model.  According  to both 
models,  from  mid-1973 to about  mid-1975, investment  was surprisingly 
strong.  Thereafter  the models diverge;  the accelerator  tracks actual  in- 
vestment  reasonably  well through  mid-1977 but indicates some weak- 
ness of investment  demand  over the last year and a half of the forecast 
period.  The modified  neoclassical  model  substantially  overpredicts  equip- 
ment investment  from  mid-1975 to mid-1977 and thereafter  does a cred- 
itable job of tracking  the actual  path. As noted earlier,  Clark  interprets 
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an alternative  interpretation,  based on the modified  neoclassical  model, 
would be that actual  investment  was weak from mid-1975 to mid-1977 
and  on track  thereafter. 
For structures  the issue is more  clear-cut  because  all the specifications 
systematically  overpredict  actual investment  in the post-1973 period. 
While it seems plausible  to  conclude that investment  in structures  has 
been unusually  low in the forecast  period (the only exception  being the 
modified  neoclassical  model for 1978),  even this judgment  is slightly 
suspect.  The reason  is that none of the five models  for structures  does a 
particularly  good job, even within the sample  period, so no fully satis- 
factory  standard  of comparison  is available. 
Clark  sheds some more light on the shortfall  by analyzing  disaggre- 
gated data on investment.  When this is done, commercial  structures  ap- 
pear to be the primary  source of the shortfall, although  whether one 
judges this component  to  be surprisingly  low depends on providing  a 
suitable  equation  to explain  it. This has not been done successfully  so it 
remains  an open issue. And the disaggregated  approach  cuts both ways. 
For example,  some  writers  have  pointed  to a burst  of noncapacity-creating 
investment  in pollution  equipment.  It might  then  turn  out that  equipment 
investment,  excluding  this category,  is weaker  than expected.  Although 
this particular  breakdown  is not analyzed,  Clark  finds a similar  problem 
when he separates  cars and trucks from other equipment  investment; 
equipment  excluding  cars and trucks  does appear  weak. Data problems 
suggest  this may be a red herring,  but the general  point should  be clear. 
Namely, once one starts  disaggregating,  conclusions  based on aggregate 
data  may  be reversed. 
While I have presented  a number  of quibbles  with Clark's  paper, I 
should  like to repeat  that he has done an extremely  careful  job and has 
given those concerned  with investment  behavior  much  food for thought. 
Peter Clark: Alan Greenspan  correctly  emphasizes  the interdependence 
of investment  in equipment  and structures.  It is not clear, however,  that 
this interdependence  makes  much  difference  in the empirical  results.  For 
each  of the five  models,  the explanatory  variables  for equipment  and  struc- 
tures are nearly  the same. If they were identical,  and no adjustment  for 
autocorrelation  had been used, the coefficients  for each explanatory  vari- 
able  in the aggregate  equation  would  be exactly  the sum  of the coefficients 
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aggregate  version  would be precisely  the sum of the forecasts  from the 
separate  equations.  Because  the explanatory  variables  are  not quite  iden- 
tical, and an autocorrelation  correction  was used, the exact relation  does 
not hold. But it is a good approximation;  for each of the five models an 
aggregate  equation  holds  no surprises  in terms  of coefficients  and  forecasts. 
To be sure,  an aggregate  "additive"  equation  would  fit  much  better  than 
the separate  equations  in the event of "offsetting  errors."  That would be 
the case  if, for any  particular  model,  the  residuals  for equipment  and  struc- 
tures  had a strong  negative  relationship.  However,  I do not find such a 
relationship:  the correlation  between  residuals  from the equipment  and 
structures  equations  is close  to zero  in all five  models. 
Although  a combined  equation  typically  indicates  that  total investment 
is below  predicted  values  for 1974-78, the deviation  is not significant.  By 
contrast,  separate  equations  for equipment  track  fairly  well for the past 
five years, while those for structures  overpredict  significantly.  Thus the 
separate  equations  reveal that almost all the weakness  in nonresidential 
fixed investment  can be attributed  to the structures  component.  In addi- 
tion, the equations  for structures  generally  show that  the standard  invest- 
ment  models  have very  low explanatory  power  for that area.  These con- 
clusions  would not have been evident  if I had estimated  equations  only 
for the  total  of business  fixed  investment. 
In addition,  I should  like to comment  on the feeling of economists  in 
general,  and Greenspan  and Goldfeld  in particular,  that a model which 
does not include  factor prices  is somehow  unscientific.  On the contrary, 
there  is a long tradition  in the physical  sciences  of using  different  approxi- 
mations  in models designed  to explain the evolution of systems  during 
different  periods  of time. Thus the equations  used to explain the short- 
term pulsations  of a star are very different  from those that explain its 
evolution  over  billions  of years  from  a contracting  cloud of gas to a white 
dwarf.  Analogously,  my analysis  indicates  merely  that  prices  have  evolved 
slowly enough  over the past thirty  years  that they do not help to explain 
the cyclical  variation  of business  fixed investment. 
General  Discussion 
Several  participants  considered  why the cost-of-capital  variable  had 
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cost of capital used by Clark  might bear little resemblance  to the truly 
relevant  measure. For one thing, the weighting of bonds and stocks 
seemed  arbitrary.  Second, the real interest  rate variable  did not take ac- 
count  of the fact that the tax laws allow  the deduction  of the full nominal 
cost of borrowing.  A real interest  rate that results from a high nominal 
rate associated  with a high inflation  rate may have different  effects  from 
the same  real rate  derived  from  a lower  nominal  interest  rate  and a lower 
inflation rate. Even more fundamentally,  Feldstein  expressed  a lack of 
faith in any single composite  variable  for the cost of capital,  which pre- 
sumed  identical  responses  to changes  in all components.  He mentioned, 
for example,  that he had found different  investment  responses  in British 
data to equivalent  changes  in investment  tax credits,  depreciation  allow- 
ances,  and  interest  rates. 
James Duesenberry  recalled that investment  studies have generally 
found  some  utilization  variable  or output-growth  variable  to be dominant. 
Often some financial  variable  helps, too; but the auxiliary  variable  that 
does best seems to change.  He did not find this surprising,  however,  as 
actual investment  behavior  is likely to change.  Sometimes  corporations 
use higher  hurdle  rates of return  because  of perceived  cyclical risks; at 
times, those firms are especially  concerned  about their stock prices; at 
other  times,  they  worry  most about  their  debt  position.  It may  be impossi- 
ble to obtain  stable,  consistent  results  from  any  particular  financial  varia- 
ble. But that did not mean that investment  was driven merely by a 
mechanistic  acceleration  principle.  Duesenberry  urged  that  the considera- 
tions that  go into capital  budgeting  in industry  should  be studied  carefully 
by economists  looking  for insight  in this  area. 
Franco Modigliani  described  past findings,  which reported  that the 
addition  of a cost-of-capital  variable  significantly  improved  the results  of 
a pure accelerator  formulation.  He suspected  that Clark's  negative  find- 
ings on this issue  reflected  differences  in specification  and  thus  were  not a 
valid  contradiction  of the previous  results. 
Robert  Hall offered  a different  interpretation  of Clark's  results  on the 
cost of capital.  He felt that the equations  in the paper  suffered  severely 
from  problems  of simultaneity  or two-way  causation.  Clark  considers  the 
line of causation  leading  from lower interest  rates to higher  investment. 
But another  line leads from an exogenous  rise in demand  that increases 
investment  to higher  interest  rates. The latter  route would account  thus 
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ment and of no negative  relationship  between  interest  rates and invest- 
ment.  Robert  Gordon  suggested  that the two directions  might be disen- 
tangled  by identifying  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  changes  that  should  have 
shifted  either  the IS or the LM curve.  Clark  noted that  his application  of 
the Sims  test  had determined  that  simultaneity  was not a serious  problem. 
Gordon  pointed  out, however,  that  the Sims  test related  future  investment 
to current  output,  but there is a contemporaneous  relationship  between 
investment  and output  because  investment  is part of GNP. Gordon  sug- 
gested  fitting  a modified  accelerator  model that related  business  fixed in- 
vestment  to GNP excluding such investment.  Modigliani  objected that 
such  an equation  would  not be freed  from  the effect  of investment  on con- 
sumption  and  moreover  would  be a misstatement  of the accelerator  theory. 
Clark  felt that  Hall and  Gordon  had  exaggerated  the simultaneity  problem 
and reminded  the group  that nonresidential  fixed  investment  is only part 
of the  U.S. capital  market. 
William  Nordhaus  defended  Clark's  basic approach,  commenting  that 
more work of this type should be done to sort out the performance  of 
alternative  theories.  He was concerned  that some of the critics  were too 
quick to offer theories  to eliminate  empirical  findings  they did not like. 
Nordhaus  added  that  Clark's  finding  of a low elasticity  of substitution  was 
particularly  striking.  Yet he recalled that several other studies  had ob- 
tained similar  results,  in sharp contrast  to the assumption  of the "neo- 
classical"  model. Indeed,  Nordhaus  suggested  that  the low estimate  was a 
typical  result  of studies  that examined  this parameter  carefully,  either  in 
investment  equations  or in production  functions. 
Modigliani  noted that the weakness  of the stock market  (and the re- 
sulting  high  value  of the dividend-price  ratio) depresses  the  current  invest- 
ment  forecasts  of any equation  that emphasizes  the value of securities  or 
the cost of capital.  From that  point of view, there  is a genuine  mystery  of 
why  investment  is so high.  He offered  the conjecture  that  the stock  market 
is low because buyers  of securities  compare  the earnings-price  ratio on 
equities  with the nominal  (rather  than  the real) rate  of interest  on bonds. 
Meanwhile,  corporate  executives  may  be capitalizing  the  prospective  nom- 
inal  stream  of returns  from  investment  projects  by the earnings-price  ratio, 
thereby  preventing  any  severe  adverse  impact  of depressed  stock  prices  on 
capital  spending. 
James Tobin agreed that theories using rates of return  and market 
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vestment.  He noted,  however,  that although  empirical  specifications  used 
the average  value  for Q, the theory  focused  on marginal  Q. In recent  years 
a number  of factors  may have raised  the return  at the margin  relative  to 
average  profit  rates. For example,  pollution investments  are obligatory 
and therefore  have a high  implicit  profit  rate, even  if they  do not show  up 
that way in the valuation  of the stock market.  Similarly,  new investment 
related  to energy  might  exceed  past  investment  in its  profitability. 
Several  panel members  suggested  alternative  specifications  that might 
improve  the understanding  of investment  demand.  Elaborating  on a theme 
introduced  by Greenspan,  Charles  Holt called attention  to the substantial 
lag between  investment  decisions and actual capital outlays. The latter 
outlays  are  really  a weighted  average  of decisions  made  over an extensive 
period  in the past. That argued  for a two-stage  modeling  of the process 
that explained  orders  in one equation  and then related expenditures  to 
orders  in a second.  Hendrik  Houthakker  felt that  disaggregation  by indus- 
try  might  be fruitful.  And Dwight  Jaffee  suggested  that  greater  disaggrega- 
tion  was  required  to explain  the structures  puzzle.  Jaffee  noted  that  various 
types  of structures  were  influenced  by different  factors:  office  buildings  by 
vacancy  rates, commercial  structures  by certain  demographic  variables 
and  retail  sales,  hospitals  by government  grant  programs,  and  schools  and 
religious  buildings  by other demographic  elements.  He also emphasized 
the need to pay more attention  to considerations  on the supply  side that 
influence  the resources  available  in the construction  industry  and  hence  its 
capacity  output. 